State v. Cochran

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Appellant,

v.

M'Andre Cochran, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001023

Appeal From Georgetown County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-086
Submitted February 1, 2021 – Filed March 17, 2021

AFFIRMED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Senior Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II,
of Conway, all for Appellant.

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The State appeals the trial court's grant of immunity to M'Andre
Cochran under the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act)1 for the fatal
stabbing of Emmitt Kelly. The State argues the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Cochran immunity because he could not establish a claim of self-defense.
We affirm.

At the hearing, Cochran testified he arrived home around 5:00 a.m. from working
an overnight shift and discovered an unknown vehicle parked at his house and the
front door of his house ajar. Fearing the house had been burglarized, Cochran
entered the house and armed himself with a knife. While inspecting the home,
Cochran encountered an unknown man in his dark master bedroom. The man
threw a punch at Cochran, and a fight ensued. During the fight, Cochran fatally
stabbed the man. Unbeknownst to Cochran, his partner had invited the man to
spend the night with her. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
Cochran immunity because evidence supports the three required elements of
self-defense. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 370, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266
(2013) ("A claim of immunity under the Act requires a pretrial determination using
a preponderance of the evidence standard, which this court reviews under an abuse
of discretion standard of review."); State v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d
132, 136 (2016) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the [trial] court's ruling is
based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without
evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C) (2015) ("A person who is
not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in another place where he
has a right to be, . . . has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground and
meet force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or another person or to
prevent the commission of a violent crime as defined in Section 16-1-60."); Curry,
406 S.C. at 371, 752 S.E.2d at 266 ("Consistent with the Castle Doctrine and the
text of the Act, a valid case of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must
necessarily consider the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant's
entitlement to the Act's immunity."); State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716
S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) (stating the elements of self-defense are: "(1) The defendant
was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) The defendant . . . actually
believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily
injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger; (3) If the defense is based upon
the defendant's actual belief of imminent danger, a reasonable prudent man of
ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief . . . ; and (4)

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2015).
The defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his
own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular
instance." ((omissions by court) quoting State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 545, 500
S.E.2d 489, 493 (1998))); Jones, 416 S.C. at 291, 786 S.E.2d at 136 ("Under the
Castle Doctrine, '[o]ne attacked, without fault on his part, on his own premises, has
the right, in establishing his plea of self-defense, to claim immunity from the law
of retreat, which ordinarily is an essential element of that defense.'" (quoting State
v. Gordon, 128 S.C. 422, 425, 122 S.E. 501, 502 (1924))); Curry, 406 S.C. at 371,
752 S.E.2d at 266 (stating the fourth element of self-defense need not be shown
when seeking immunity under the Act).

AFFIRMED.2

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.