Aikman v. State of South Carolina

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Chavis Aikman, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002295

Appeal From Berkeley County
W. Jeffrey Young, Revocation Judge
Michael G. Nettles, Post-Conviction Relief Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-096
Submitted January 1, 2021 – Filed March 24, 2021

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Petitioner.

Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Hunter Limbaugh,
of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from the denial of his
application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Because there is sufficient evidence
to support the PCR judge's finding that Petitioner did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a direct appeal, we grant certiorari on Petitioner's
Question One and proceed with a review of the direct appeal issue pursuant to
Davis v. State, 288 S.C. 290, 342 S.E.2d 60 (1986).

On direct appeal, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his request
for counsel at the probation revocation hearing and (2) revoking his probation
without sufficient evidentiary support. On October 31, 2014, Petitioner appeared
in court for a probation revocation hearing. Petitioner requested counsel several
times during the hearing, but the court denied Petitioner's requests and proceeded
with the hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court revoked Petitioner's
probation in full. Because the trial court denied Petitioner the right to counsel
despite his repeated requests for counsel at the hearing, we reverse the trial court's
revocation of Petitioner's probation and remand for a new probation revocation
hearing pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Salley v.
State, 306 S.C. 213, 215, 410 S.E.2d 921, 922 (1991) ("The right to counsel
attaches in probation revocation hearings."); Turner v. State, 384 S.C. 451, 454,
682 S.E.2d 792, 793 (2009) ("However, a probationer does not have a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."); id. ("Rather, the right to counsel may arise
pursuant to the Due Process Clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."); id. ("In South Carolina . . . all persons charged with probation
violations have a right to counsel and must be informed of this right pursuant to
court rules and case law."); Rule 602(a), SCACR (stating "every person charged
with the violation of a probationary sentence shall be taken as soon as practicable
before the Clerk of the Court of General Sessions in the county where the charges
are preferred . . . for the purpose of securing to the accused the right to counsel");
Salley, 306 S.C. at 215, 410 S.E.2d at 922 (stating an individual may waive his or
her right to counsel; however, the trial court "has the duty to ensure that [an
individual] makes an intelligent and competent waiver of counsel"); id. ("The trial
[court] should advise the defendant of his right to counsel, and adequately warn the
defendant of the dangers of self-representation."); id. (stating an appellate court
"will look to the record to discern whether there are facts to show the defendant
had sufficient background or was apprised of his rights by some other source so as
to constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel"); State v.
Bryant, 383 S.C. 410, 415, 680 S.E.2d 11, 13-14 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting an
appellate court can consider several factors when determining whether an
individual has a sufficient background to understand the dangers of proceeding pro
se, including the accused's background, previous involvement in criminal trials,
previous representation by counsel before trial, the appointment of standby
counsel, and whether the waiver resulted from coercion); Salley, 306 S.C. at 216,
410 S.E.2d at 922 (concluding the probationer did not knowingly and intelligently
waive her right to counsel because she was not informed of the dangers of self-
representation and she did not want to proceed without counsel). Accordingly, we
reverse the revocation of Petitioner's probation and remand for a new revocation
hearing.1

REVERSED AND REMANDED.2

THOMAS, HILL, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
Because we reverse the trial court's revocation of Petitioner's probation based on
the denial of the right to counsel, we need not address Petitioner's remaining direct
appeal issue. See Futch v. McAllister, 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (stating appellate courts need not address remaining issues when disposition
of a prior issue is dispositive).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.