State v. Middleton

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Stewart Jerome Middleton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002478

Appeal From Charleston County
J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-271
Submitted June 1, 2020 – Filed September 30, 2020

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne
Wilson, of Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Stewart Jerome Middleton appeals his conviction for
third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), arguing the trial court erred in
(1) denying his motion for a directed verdict and (2) admitting Detective Rebecca
Bailey's testimony indicating Middleton failed to show up for two appointments
and delayed giving a statement to the police. We affirm.1

1. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Middleton's motion for a directed
verdict. At trial, an Embassy Suites employee testified that when he found the
victim shortly after the alleged assault occurred, she was "definitely not sober,"
was unable to walk to his office without assistance, was unable to speak to the 911
operator, and had difficulty holding a conversation. The victim's coworker
testified that at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the night of the alleged assault, the
victim was stumbling and repeatedly fell onto the floor as he helped her back to her
hotel room. The coworker also testified that Middleton followed him uninvited
into the victim's hotel room when he returned to check on the victim. Another
hotel employee testified that at 10:25 p.m., he issued a key for the victim's hotel
room to a man who claimed to be the victim's boyfriend. The police officer who
responded to the 911 call testified that when he arrived at the hotel at
approximately 11:38 p.m., the victim smelled of alcohol, was slurring her speech,
and was stumbling. An emergency room nurse testified the victim arrived at the
hospital at 12:35 a.m. and the victim's blood alcohol content at 3:38 a.m. was .264,
or nearly "toxic." Finally, Middleton asserted that shortly before the alleged
assault, the victim locked herself out of her hotel room while wearing only a towel
and she was crying and fell onto the floor immediately before Middleton claimed
he and the victim had sex. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
we find the evidence presented was substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably
tending to prove Middleton was guilty of third-degree CSC. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in denying Middleton's motion for a directed verdict. See State v.
Harry, 420 S.C. 290, 298, 803 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2017) ("In reviewing the denial of
a motion for a directed verdict, [the appellate court] must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the State."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593-94, 606
S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("If there is . . . substantial circumstantial evidence
reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find
the case was properly submitted to the jury."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-654(1)(b)
(2015) ("A person is guilty of [third-degree CSC] if the actor engages in sexual
battery with the victim and . . . [t]he actor knows or has reason to know that the
victim is . . . mentally incapacitated[] or physically helpless . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-3-651(h) (2015) (stating "sexual battery" is "sexual intercourse or . . . any
intrusion . . . of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person's body"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-651(f) (2015) (stating
a person is "mentally incapacitated" if the person is "temporarily incapable of

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
appraising or controlling his or her conduct"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-651(g)
(2015) (stating a person is "physically helpless" if the person is "unconscious,
asleep, or for any reason physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an
act").

2. We hold the trial court did not err in admitting Detective Rebecca Bailey's
testimony that Middleton failed to show up for two appointments for an interview
and delayed giving a statement to the police because the testimony was evidence of
evasive conduct that was relevant to show Middleton's consciousness of guilt. See
State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of
the trial court either lack[ed] evidentiary support or [were] controlled by an error of
law."); Rule 401, SCRE (stating evidence is "relevant" if it has "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence"); State v. Martin, 403 S.C. 19, 26,
742 S.E.2d 42, 46 (Ct. App. 2013) ("As a general rule, any guilty act, conduct, or
statements on the part of the accused are admissible as some evidence of [the
accused's] consciousness of guilt." (quoting State v. McDowell, 266 S.C. 508, 515,
224 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1976))); id. at 28, 742 S.E.2d at 47 (recognizing evidence of
evasive conduct may be admissible to show a defendant's consciousness of guilt).
Additionally, we find the evidence presented at trial justified an inference of a
nexus between the evasive conduct and the charge, including (1) Detective Bailey
telling Middleton that "she wanted him to come in to take [his] statement,"
(2) Detective Bailey offering to accommodate Middleton's schedule by meeting
"whatever day, whatever time" was best for him, (3) Middleton missing two
appointments without explanation and failing to reschedule, and (4) Middleton
stating at the beginning of his interview with Detective Bailey that he "kn[e]w
what [the meeting] was about" and asking if the the victim had filed a police
report. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting Detective Bailey's
testimony. See Martin, 403 S.C. at 27, 742 S.E.2d at 46 (stating evidence of
evasive conduct is admissible if the "circumstances justify an inference that the
accused's actions were motivated as a result of his belief that police officers were
aware of his wrongdoing and were seeking him for that purpose" (quoting State v.
Orozco, 392 S.C. 212, 220, 708 S.E.2d 227, 231 (Ct. App. 2011), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016), abrogated
on other grounds by State v. Cartwright, 425 S.C. 81, 819 S.E.2d 756 (2018))); id.
(providing there must be a nexus between the evasive conduct in question and the
offense charged).
AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.