State v. McCall

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Eric D. McCall, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000800

Appeal From Berkeley County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-136
Submitted May 1, 2020 – Filed May 20, 2020

AFFIRMED

Tristan Michael Shaffer, of Tristan M. Shaffer Attorney
at Law, of Chapin, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Eric D. McCall appeals the circuit court's dismissal of his motion
for resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Aiken v.
Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). On appeal, McCall argues he was
entitled to a hearing in which the circuit court would re-evaluate his sentence in
light of Miller and Byars. Because McCall was nineteen years old at the time he
committed the crime for which he was sentenced, we affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 423,
831 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 2019) ("When considering whether a sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments,
the appellate court's standard of review extends only to the correction of errors of
law."); id. ("Therefore, this court will not disturb the circuit court's findings absent
a manifest abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the
circuit court's finding is based on an error of law or grounded in factual
conclusions without evidentiary support."); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (holding a
mandatory life imprisonment sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders "poses too
great a risk of disproportionate punishment" and thus violates the Eighth
Amendment); Byars, 410 S.C. at 541, 765 S.E.2d at 576 ("[T]he principles
enunciated in Miller . . . apply . . . to all juvenile offenders who may be subject to a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole."); Id. at 537 n.1,
765 S.E.2d at 573 n.1 ("Miller extends to defendants under eighteen years of age
and therefore for the purposes of this opinion we consider juveniles to be
individuals under eighteen.").

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and GEATHERS and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.