State v. Hyatt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ronald Yates Hyatt, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001872

Appeal From Lancaster County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-318
Submitted March 5, 2019 – Filed September 25, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Sherrie Butterbaugh, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this criminal matter, Ronald Yates Hyatt appeals the circuit
court's denial of his pro se motion to reconsider his sentence pursuant to Aiken v.
Byars.1 On appeal, Hyatt argues his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole is functionally equivalent to a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP), which violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Specifically, Hyatt
contends his sentence constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence because (1) the South
Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (the Department)
denied him parole sixteen consecutive times and (2) the Department is not required
to consider mitigating factors of youth when making parole determinations. We
affirm.

When considering whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments, the appellate court's standard of review extends
only to the correction of errors of law. See State v. Perez, 423 S.C. 491, 496, 816
S.E.2d 550, 553 (2018). Therefore, this court will not disturb the circuit court's
findings absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the circuit court's finding is based on an error of law or grounded in factual
conclusions without evidentiary support. Id. at 496–97, 816 S.E.2d at 553; State v.
Johnson, 413 S.C. 458, 466, 776 S.E.2d 367, 371 (2015).

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII (emphasis added). In this vein,
sentences that are grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime are
unconstitutional. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–60 (2010). Applying this
principle to juvenile offenders, the United States Supreme Court has incrementally
established parameters to ensure proportional juvenile sentences. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty was a disproportionate
punishment for an offender who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the
crime because developmental differences between juveniles and adults resulted in
diminished culpability); Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 74 (holding the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the imposition of an LWOP sentence on a juvenile offender
for a nonhomicide crime); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012)
(holding mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth

1
410 S.C. 534, 545, 765 S.E.2d 572, 578 (2014) (holding a juvenile offender
serving an LWOP sentence could file a motion for resentencing when the
sentencing court issued the sentence without considering various mitigating factors
of the offender's youth).
Amendment and requiring a sentencing court issuing an LWOP sentence for
homicide to a juvenile offender to conduct an individualized hearing in which it
considers various factors, such as the offender's age and maturity and the
circumstances surrounding the homicide offense).

We find the circuit court did not err in denying Hyatt's motion for resentencing.
Although Hyatt received a mandatory life sentence for murder as a juvenile
offender, the circuit court's sentence afforded Hyatt parole eligibility after the
service of twenty years' imprisonment.2 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) (Supp.
1980) (providing that a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must
be sentenced to (1) death or (2) life imprisonment with the possibility of parole
after twenty years' imprisonment). This sentence differs significantly from those at
issue in Graham, Miller, and Byars in which the juvenile offenders received
sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility for parole. See Graham, 560
U.S. at 82 ("The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." (emphasis added));
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 ("We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders." (emphasis added)); Byars, 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578
("We hold the principles enunciated in Miller . . . apply . . . to all juvenile offenders
who may be subject to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole." (emphasis added)). Therefore, we find Hyatt is not a member of the class
of offenders contemplated by our precedent as he did not receive an LWOP
sentence. See State v. Slocumb, 426 S.C. 297, 306, 314–15, 827 S.E.2d 148, 153,
157 (2019) (noting this court's review is confined by the parameters established by
the United States Supreme Court and therefore declining to extend the holdings of
Graham and Miller to include de facto LWOP sentences imposed upon juvenile
offenders); State v. Finley, Op. No. 5665 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 17, 2019)
(Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 29 at 27–35) (holding life sentences with the possibility
of parole imposed upon juvenile offenders do not violate the Eighth Amendment);
id. (holding juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility
of parole are not entitled to resentencing pursuant to Byars).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's order is

2
Hyatt became parole eligible on April 26, 1998.
AFFIRMED.3

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.