State v. Moore

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Gary Moore, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000779

Appeal From Chesterfield County
Roger E. Henderson, Circuit Court Judge
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-234
Submitted February 1, 2019 – Filed June 26, 2019

AFFIRMED

Tricia A. Blanchette, of Law Office of Tricia A.
Blanchette, LLC, of Leesville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Benjamin Rogers, Jr.,
of Bennettsville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in finding Moore was not entitled to
immunity from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act: State
v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 370, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013) ("A claim of immunity
under the Act requires a pretrial determination using a preponderance of the
evidence standard, which [the appellate] court reviews under an abuse of discretion
standard of review."); State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 316, 768 S.E.2d 232, 238
(Ct. App. 2014) ("[U]nder this standard, the appellate court 'does not re-evaluate
the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply
determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence'" (quoting
State v. Mitchell, 382 S.C. 1, 4, 675 S.E.2d 435, 437 (2009))); Curry, 406 S.C. at
371, 752 S.E.2d at 266 ("Consistent with the Castle Doctrine and the text of the
Act, a valid case of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must necessarily
consider the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant's entitlement to
the Act's immunity. This includes all elements of self-defense, save the duty to
retreat."); id. at 372, 752 S.E.2d at 267 ("While the Act may be considered
'offensive' in the sense that the immunity operates as a bar to prosecution, such
immunity is predicated on an accused demonstrating the [necessary] elements of
self-defense to the satisfaction of the trial court by the preponderance of the
evidence."); id. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4 (specifying the second and third
elements of self-defense that must be demonstrated for immunity under the Act are
as follows: "Second, the defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent
danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in
such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based upon his belief of imminent
danger, a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have
entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the
circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness
and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily
harm or losing his own life." (quoting State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d
452, 453 (1984))); id. at 372, 752 S.E.2d at 267 (providing when a claim of self-
defense presents a "quintessential jury question," immunity from prosecution is not
warranted); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C) (2015) ("A person who is not engaged
in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in another place where he has a right to
be . . . has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground and meet force
with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is necessary to
prevent death or great bodily injury to himself . . . ." (emphasis added)).

2. As to whether the trial court erred by failing to grant Moore a directed
verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When
reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] views the evidence
and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state."); id. at 292-
93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the
[appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v.
Oates, 421 S.C. 1, 19, 803 S.E.2d 911, 921 (Ct. App. 2017) ("[O]ur well-
established directed verdict standard is not altered by a defendant's claim of self-
defense."); Curry, 406 S.C. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4 (noting the second
and third elements required by law to establish a case of self-defense include as
follows: "Second, the defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent
danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in
such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based upon his belief of imminent
danger, a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have
entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the
circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness
and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily
harm or losing his own life." (quoting Davis, 282 S.C. at 46, 317 S.E.2d at 453)).

3. As to whether the trial court committed reversible error in response to a jury
question: State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003) ("To warrant
reversal, a trial judge's charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial."); State v.
Middleton, 407 S.C. 312, 317, 755 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2014) ("When considering
whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must
'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict.'" (quoting State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 144-45, 498 S.E.2d
212, 218 (Ct. App. 1998))); id. ("In making a harmless error analysis, our inquiry
is not what the verdict would have been had the jury been given the correct charge,
but whether the erroneous charge contributed to the verdict rendered." (quoting
Kerr, 330 S.C. at 145, 498 S.E.2d at 218)).

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.