Glover v. Simpson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Denetra Glover, Respondent,

v.

William Shermon Stack and Shervon Latreese Simpson,
Defendants,

of Whom Shervon Latreese Simpson is the Appellant.

AND

Shirley Davis, Respondent,

v.

William Shermon Stack and Shervon Latreese Simpson,
Defendants,

of Whom Shervon Latreese Simpson is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001807

Appeal From Orangeburg County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-167
Submitted February 1, 2019 – Filed May 8, 2019

AFFIRMED
Wesley Brian Sawyer, of Murphy & Grantland, PA, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Shane Morris Burroughs and David C. Marshall, both of
Lanier & Burroughs, LLC, of Orangeburg, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Shervon Latreese Simpson appeals the order of the circuit court
denying her motion for entry of satisfaction of judgment. On appeal, she argues
the circuit court erred in (1) allowing a double recovery by failing to offset a
default judgment by the amount paid by a second tortfeasor and (2) determining a
default damages hearing did not establish the total amount of damages arising from
an indivisible injury. We affirm.

Section 15-38-50 of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides:

When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more
persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
wrongful death:

(1) it does not discharge any of the other
tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful
death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the
claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant,
or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is the greater; and

(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution to any other
tortfeasor.

"[T]he [statute] represents the [l]egislature's determination of the proper balance
between preventing double-recovery and South Carolina's 'strong public policy
favoring the settlement of disputes.'" Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 414 S.C. 185, 196,
777 S.E.2d 824, 830 (2015) (quoting Chester v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 388 S.C.
343, 346, 698 S.E.2d 559, 560 (2010)).

We find the circuit court did not err in denying Simpson's motion for entry of
satisfaction of judgment. In its written orders, the circuit court reasoned section
15-38-50 applies when one defendant settles before a verdict is reached against a
second defendant. Indeed, the cases Simpson relied on in front of the circuit court
and on appeal reflect that our courts have interpreted section 15-38-50 to apply
when one defendant settles before a jury verdict is entered against the nonsettling
defendant. See Ellis v. Oliver, 335 S.C. 106, 110–12, 515 S.E.2d 268, 270–71 (Ct.
App. 1999) (granting a setoff under section 15-38-50 in a medical malpractice
action when the plaintiff settled her case against the hospital prior to receiving a
judgment against the individual doctor); see also Smith v. Widener, 397 S.C. 468,
471–72, 724 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating that "before entering
judgment on a jury verdict, the court must reduce the amount of the verdict to
account for any funds previously paid by a settling defendant, so long as the
settlement funds were paid to compensate the same plaintiff on a claim for the
same injury"); Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 312, 536 S.E.2d 408, 425 (Ct. App.
2000) (stating a nonsettling defendant is entitled to a credit for an amount
previously paid by a settling defendant). Here, on the other hand, two default
judgments were entered against Simpson before defendant Stack settled his cases
with the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court's finding that
Simpson was not entitled to a setoff under the statute.

Simpson also argues that if section 15-38-50 does not apply, she is nonetheless
entitled to a setoff under common law equity principles. We find this argument is
not preserved for our review. Although Simpson raised this issue during the
motion hearing, the circuit court's final orders addressed only Simpson's
entitlement to a setoff under the statute. Because Simpson did not subsequently
file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion seeking a ruling on her common law equity
argument, it is not preserved for appellate review. See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of
Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) (holding a party must file a
Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to reconsider when an argument has been raised, but
not ruled on, to preserve it for appellate review).

As Simpson was not entitled to a setoff under the statute and her common law
grounds are not preserved for our review, she is required to satisfy the full amounts
of the default judgments against her. Thus, we find the first issue is dispositive and
decline to address Simpson's remaining issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when the disposition of a prior
issue is dispositive).

Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED. 1

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.