Howell v. Train Auto Sales

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ken Howell and Karen Nicole Lamb, Respondents,

v.

Train Auto Sales, Inc., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000092

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-138
Submitted March 1, 2019 – Filed April 17, 2019

REVERSED AND REMANDED

J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Andrew Ross Hart, of Alford & Hart, LLC, of
Spartanburg, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Train Auto Sales, Inc. (Train), appeals the dismissal of its
counterclaim for a repairman's lien against Ken Howell and Karen Nicole Lamb
(collectively, Owners) for repairs performed on their vehicle. Train argues the
circuit court erred by finding its lien was extinguished due to its failure to maintain
continuous possession of the vehicle. We reverse.1

"On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), [SCRCP,] an
appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial court." Freemantle
v. Preston, 398 S.C. 186, 192, 728 S.E.2d 40, 43 (2012) (quoting Rydde v. Morris,
381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009)). When "deciding a motion to
dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the [circuit] court [and reviewing court]
should consider only the allegations set forth on the face of the [pleadings]."
Plyler v. Burns, 373 S.C. 637, 645, 647 S.E.2d 188, 192 (2007). The court "may
dismiss a claim when the [movant] demonstrates the [claimant's] 'failure to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action' in the pleadings." FOC Lawshe Ltd.
v. Int'l Paper Co., 352 S.C. 408, 412, 574 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP). "A motion to dismiss a counterclaim must be
based solely on the allegations set forth in the counterclaim." Charleston Cty. Sch.
Dist. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 348 S.C. 420, 424, 559 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Ct. App.
2001). "The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the [claimant], and
with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the [pleading] states any valid claim for
relief." Plyler, 373 S.C. at 645, 647 S.E.2d at 192.

A repairman's lien arises in an article when (1) the article was left at the
repairman's shop for repairs and the repairs have been completed, (2) "the article
has been continuously retained in his possession," and (3) thirty days have passed
since written notice was given to the owner of the article that the repairs were
completed. S.C. Code Ann. § 29-15-10(A) (2007) (emphasis added); S.C. Code
Ann. § 29-15-10(G) (Supp. 2018) ("For purposes of his section, 'article' means a
motor vehicle . . . ."); see also Welcome Home Ctr., Inc. v. Cent. Chevrolet Co.,
272 S.C. 166, 167, 249 S.E.2d 896, 896 (1978) ("By statute and under the common
law, the vitality of a repairman's lien is conditioned on his continuous possession
of the article."); id. at 168, 249 S.E.2d at 896 ("Surrender of possession [or] the
giving of credit to the owner of the property destroy[s] the lien." (quoting Clark
Bros. & Co. v. Pou, 20 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1927))); id. (holding when an owner
took a vehicle to a garage for service and paid for the service after it was
completed, but the garage refused to return the vehicle until the owner paid for
work previously performed on the vehicle, the owner was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because the repairman's lien expired when the garage relinquished
possession of the vehicle); Bouknight v. Headden, 188 S.C. 300, 303, 199 S.E. 315,
316 (1938) (opining that when a repairman voluntarily parts with possession of an

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
article before he receives compensation, his lien upon the article is lost); id.
(finding this rule only applies when the repairman also parts with his special
property in the article when he loses possession).

Owners moved to dismiss Train's counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP,
arguing Train's admission that it allowed Howell to test drive the van constituted
an admission that it voluntarily relinquished possession of the van to Owners and
thus failed to maintain continuous possession of the van. In its counterclaim, Train
alleged the van was not running when Howell dropped it off for repairs, and it was
able to get the van running. Train alleged Howell came to the shop to inquire
about the status of the repairs to the van and Train informed him the van was
operating but still needed additional repairs. Train stated it allowed Howell to "test
drive" the van and he did not return it. Train alleged it maintained continuous
possession of the van and did not intend to waive its lien when it allowed Howell
to drive it. The circuit court dismissed the counterclaim, finding Train admitted it
voluntarily relinquished possession of the van by admitting it allowed Howell to
test drive it. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Train, with every
doubt resolved in its behalf, we hold Train's admission that it allowed Howell to
test drive the van was not an admission that it voluntarily relinquished possession
because Train also alleged it maintained continuous possession and did not intend
to waive its lien by allowing Howell to drive the van. See Stiles v. Onorato, 318
S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602-03 (1995) ("A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may not
be sustained if facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would
entitle the [claimant] to any relief on any theory of the case."); Bouknight, 188 S.C.
at 303, 199 S.E. at 316 (stating when a repairman voluntarily parts with possession
of an article before he receives payment for the work performed, he loses his lien
upon the article); id. (stating that if the repairman does not also part with his
special property in the article when possession is lost, the lien survives).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and HILL, JJ., concur.