SCDSS v. Obregon-Mejia

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Rosalinda Obregon-Mejia, Miguel Diaz-Duran, et al,
Defendants,

v.

Dulce Navarrete, Third-Party Intervenor,

and

Jane Doe and John Doe, Fourth-Party Intervenors,

Of whom Rosalinda Obregon-Mejia is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002073

Appeal From Anderson County
Karen F. Ballenger, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-460
Submitted November 6, 2018 – Filed December 6, 2018

AFFIRMED
Edgar Michael Pinilla, of Pinilla Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

William E. Phillips, of Anderson, as Guardian ad Litem
for Appellant.

Kathleen J. Hodges, of Anderson, for South Carolina
Department of Social Services.

John Marshall Swails, Jr., of Greenville, for the Guardian
ad Litem for the minor children.

PER CURIAM: Rosalinda Obregon-Mejia (Mother) appeals an order terminating
her parental rights to her minor children, Child 1 and Child 2. On appeal, Mother
argues the family court erred in (1) admitting drug test results without a proper
foundation, (2) not requesting expert testimony about the drug test results and
relying too heavily on them, and (3) finding clear and convincing evidence showed
her home could not be made safe within twelve months. We affirm.

On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); Lewis
v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Although this court
reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the fact
that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to
evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis,
392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 651-52.

Mother's arguments all pertain to the statutory ground of severe or repetitious
harm. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2018) (providing a statutory ground
for termination of parental rights (TPR) is met when "[t]he child or another child
while residing in the parent's domicile has been harmed . . . , and because of the
severity or repetition of the abuse or neglect, it is not reasonably likely that the
home can be made safe within twelve months"); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(6)(a)(i)
(Supp. 2018) ("'Child abuse or neglect' or 'harm' occurs when . . . the parent . . .
engages in acts or omissions which present a substantial risk of physical or mental
injury to the child . . . ."). However, the family court also found the children were
in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and clear and
convincing evidence supports this ground. See § 63-7-2570(8) (providing a
statutory ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has been in foster care under the
responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months"). The
children were placed in foster care in September 2014 and remained in foster care
continuously through the end of the August 2017 TPR hearing—a period of nearly
three years. Further, the Department of Social Services (DSS) did not cause the
delay in reunification; rather, it was caused by Mother's incarceration, which
prevented her from providing a suitable home for the children. Because this
ground is met by clear and convincing evidence, we decline to address Mother's
remaining arguments, which relate to the statutory ground of severe or repetitious
harm. See § 63-7-2570 (providing the family court may order TPR upon finding
"one or more" of the statutory grounds for TPR and that TPR is in the child's best
interest); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Robin Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 613, 582
S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address an argument related to a statutory
ground when clear and convincing evidence supported another statutory ground).

Additionally, we find TPR is in the children's best interest.1 See S.C. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) (providing
the best interest of the children is the paramount consideration in a TPR case); S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the
child's interest and the parental rights conflict."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah
W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must
consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when
determining whether TPR is appropriate."). At the time of the TPR hearing, the
children had been in foster care for nearly three years and Mother was still
incarcerated on federal drug charges. We acknowledge Mother completed
parenting classes and attempted to attend drug treatment while she was
incarcerated; however, she was still incarcerated at the time of the TPR hearing
and did not expect to be released for seven or eight months. Although Mother may
be out of prison now, she had not completed drug treatment at the time of the TPR
hearing; thus, it is questionable whether she can provide a suitable home for the
children in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the children did not have a
meaningful bond with Mother. Child 1 was one year old when he was removed,

1
Although Mother did not appeal this finding by the family court, we address it
because it concerns the rights of minor children. See Ex parte Roper, 254 S.C.
558, 563, 176 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1970) ("[W]here the rights and best interests of a
minor child are concerned, the court may appropriately raise, ex mero motu, issues
not raised by the parties.").
Child 2 was removed at birth, and Mother did not have contact with them after
their removal despite being able to send letters. Thus, there is not a significant
bond that supports maintaining Mother's parental rights. Finally, the children's
foster parents and paternal aunt both expressed an interest in adopting them; thus,
it appears the children will be adopted if TPR is affirmed.2 Although Mother
advocated for relative placement, TPR and adoption is in the children's best interest
under these facts because it is a more permanent solution. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2510 (2010) ("The purpose of [the TPR statute] is to establish procedures
for the reasonable and compassionate [TPR] where children are abused, neglected,
or abandoned in order to protect the health and welfare of these children and make
them eligible for adoption . . . ."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 423 S.C. 60,
86, 814 S.E.2d 148, 161 (2018) (finding TPR rather than relative placement was in
the child's best interest when the "[f]oster [p]arents and [g]randmother want[ed] to
adopt [the child] and would provide her with permanency and stability as
compared to [her father]"); id. at 92-93, 814 S.E.2d at 165 ("Section 63-7-1700(G)
[of the South Carolina Code] (Supp. 2017) requires DSS to 'assess[] the viability of
adoption' and to 'demonstrate[] that [TPR] is not in the child's best interests' before
the family court can award 'custody or legal guardianship, or both, to a suitable, fit,
and willing relative or nonrelative.'" (alterations in Smith)). Thus, we find TPR is
in the children's best interest.

AFFIRMED.3

HUFF, SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

2
We make no finding as to who should adopt the children, as that issue is not
before this court.
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.