State v. Powell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Gerald Dewayne Powell, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001574

Appeal From Greenville County
James R. Barber, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-379
Submitted September 1, 2018 – Filed October 10, 2018

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 447, 699 S.E.2d 169, 176
(2010) ("The qualification of a witness as an expert is within the trial court's
discretion, and this [c]ourt will not reverse that decision absent an abuse of
discretion."); id. ("In determining a witness's qualifications as an expert, the trial
court should not have a solitary focus, but rather, should make an inquiry broad in
scope."); id. ("The test for qualification of an expert is a relative one that is
dependent on the particular witness's reference to the subject."); State v. Martin,
391 S.C. 508, 513, 706 S.E.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Before a witness is
qualified as an expert, the trial court must find (1) the expert's testimony will assist
the trier of fact[;] (2) the expert possesses the requisite knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education[;] and (3) and the expert's testimony is
reliable."); State v. Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460, 474, 523 S.E.2d 787, 794 (Ct. App.
1999) ("The question of whether to admit or exclude testimony of an expert
witness is within the discretion of the trial court."); State v. Jones, 417 S.C. 319,
327, 790 S.E.2d 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2016) ("This court will not disturb the [trial]
court's admissibility determinations absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion."), aff'd
as modified, 423 S.C. 631, 817 S.E.2d 268 (2018); State v. Brown, 411 S.C. 332,
338, 768 S.E.2d 246, 249 (Ct. App. 2015) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when
the [trial] court's conclusions 'either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by
an error of law.'" (quoting State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 349, 737 S.E.2d 490,
495 (2013))), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jones, 423 S.C. 631, 817
S.E.2d 268 (2018); State v. Grubbs, 353 S.C. 374, 379, 577 S.E.2d 493, 496 (Ct.
App. 2003) ("A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of an expert's testimony
constitutes an abuse of discretion where the ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair."); Brown, 411 S.C. at 339, 768 S.E.2d at 249 ("To show
prejudice, the appellant must prove 'that there is a reasonable probability the jury's
verdict was influenced by the challenged evidence or the lack thereof.'" (quoting
Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509
(2005))); State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 274, 676 S.E.2d 684, 688 (2009) ("The
foundational reliability requirement for expert testimony does not lend itself to a
one-size-fits-all approach . . . ."); id. at 274, 673 S.E.2d at 688-89 ("[T]he trial
court in the discharge of its gatekeeping role in determining admissibility must
initially answer the always present threshold questions of qualification and
reliability."); State v. Jones, 423 S.C. 631, 640, 817 S.E.2d 268, 272 (2018) ("Trial
courts are tasked only with determining whether the basis for the expert's opinion
is sufficiently reliable such that it [may be] offered into evidence."); id. at 639-40,
817 S.E.2d at 272 (finding an expert meet the reliability requirement by testifying
her opinions were supported by peer-reviewed publications, which were uniformly
accepted by other professionals in the field); Weaverling, 337 S.C. at 474, 523
S.E.2d at 794 ("Expert testimony concerning common behavioral characteristics of
sexual assault victims and the range of responses to sexual assault encountered by
experts is admissible."); id. at 475, 523 S.E.2d at 494 ("Such testimony is relevant
and helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of adolescent
victims of sexual assault.").

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.