State v. Nixon

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Evelyn Christine Nixon, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002170

Appeal From Greenville County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-232
Submitted May 1, 2018 – Filed June 6, 2018

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) ("In
criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v.
Flowers, 360 S.C. 1, 5, 598 S.E.2d 725, 727 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he appellate
standard of review in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases is limited to
determining whether any evidence supports the trial court's finding and the
appellate court may only reverse where there is clear error." (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Green, 341 S.C. 214, 219 n.3, 532 S.E.2d 896, 898 n.3 (Ct. App.
2000))); State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571, 578, 769 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2015) ("In
carrying out a routine traffic stop, law enforcement may request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation; however, any
further detention for questioning is beyond the scope of the stop and therefore
illegal unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of a serious crime."); id. ("To
determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, an officer, by a totality of the
circumstances, must have a 'particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" (quoting United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981))); id. ("Reasonable suspicion does not entail a set of
legal rules, but 'entails common sense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent persons, not legal technicians, act.'" (quoting United States v. Foreman,
369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004))); State v. Willard, 374 S.C. 129, 134, 647
S.E.2d 252, 255 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Reasonable suspicion is more than a general
hunch but less than what is required for probable cause."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 27 (1968) ("[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger."); State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 253, 639
S.E.2d 36, 40 (2006) ("This [c]ourt has recognized that because of the 'indisputable
nexus between drugs and guns,' where an officer has reasonable suspicion that
drugs are present in a vehicle lawfully stopped, there is an appropriate level of
suspicion of criminal activity and apprehension of danger to justify a frisk of . . .
the driver . . . in the absence of other factors alleviating the officer's safety
concerns." (quoting State v. Butler, 353 S.C. 383, 391, 577 S.E.2d 498, 498 (Ct.
App. 2003))).

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.