Ledford v. Department of Public Safety

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Scott Ledford, Employee, Appellant,

v.

Department of Public Safety, Employer, and State
Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000601

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-280
Heard May 16, 2018 – Filed June 27, 2018

AFFIRMED

James K. Holmes, of The Steinberg Law Firm, LLP, of
Charleston, and E. Hood Temple, of Hatfield Temple,
LLP, of Florence, both for Appellant.

Sarah C. Sutusky and John Paul Simkovich, both of
Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation action against the Department of
Public Safety (the Department), former highway patrolman Scott Ledford
(Claimant) appeals, arguing the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation
Commission (the Appellate Panel) erred in (1) failing to find the single
commissioner should have recused herself, (2) failing to find the single
commissioner improperly overruled unappealed findings of a prior single
commissioner, and (3) adopting factual findings unsupported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.

As to the first issue, we find the single commissioner was not required to recuse
herself. See Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 156, 666 S.E.2d 230, 234 (2008) ("A
judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including instances where he has a personal bias or
prejudice against a party."); Mallett v. Mallett, 323 S.C. 141, 145, 473 S.E.2d 804,
807 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Such bias must stem from an extrajudicial source and result
in decisions based on information other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case."). We further find Claimant has not attributed prejudice
to the decision of the Appellate Panel. See Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C.
276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The Appellate Panel is the
ultimate fact finder in Workers' Compensation cases . . . ."); Mallett, 323 S.C. at
145-46, 473 S.E.2d at 807 ("It is not enough for a party seeking disqualification to
simply allege bias. The party must show some evidence of bias or prejudice."); id.
at 147, 473 S.E.2d at 808 ("The fact a trial judge ultimately rules against a litigant
is not proof of prejudice by the judge, even if it is later held the judge committed
error in his rulings.").

Next, the Appellate Panel reversed the single commissioner regarding the second
issue, and we find the Appellate Panel's findings are supported by substantial
evidence. See Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 467, 617 S.E.2d 369, 376 (Ct. App.
2005) ("[T]his [c]ourt's review is limited to deciding whether the Appellate Panel's
decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by some error of
law."). Due to the Appellate Panel's reversal, we find further discussion of the
single commissioner's ruling is not warranted. See Spivey ex rel. Spivey v.
Carolina Crawler, 367 S.C. 154, 160, 624 S.E.2d 435, 438 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The
function of appellate courts is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical
matters, but only to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights of
some party to the litigation." (quoting Sloan v. Greenville Cty., 356 S.C. 531, 552,
590 S.E.2d 338, 349 (Ct. App. 2003))).

Third, we find substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's findings that
Claimant was not credible and his landscaping business remained lucrative
following the injury. See Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("The
Appellate Panel is the ultimate fact finder in Workers' Compensation cases and is
not bound by the [s]ingle [c]ommissioner's findings of fact."); id. ("The final
determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is
reserved to the Appellate Panel.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.