Taylor v. Johnson & Johnson Preferred Financing

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Daryhl Taylor, as the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Ruth T. Simpson, Respondent,

v.

Johnson & Johnson Preferred Financing, ProCentury
Insurance Company, FINCO Premium Finance Co., Inc.,
and Carolina Independent Automobile Dealers
Association, Dealers Risk and Insurance Services,
Independent Dealers Insurance Management,
Defendants,

Of whom ProCentury Insurance Company is the
Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000867

Appeal From Anderson County
J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-123
Submitted February 1, 2018 – Filed March 21, 2018

AFFIRMED

Phillip E. Reeves and Nicholas Andrew Farr, both of
Gallivan, White & Boyd, PA, of Greenville, for
Appellant.
Steven M. Krause, of Krause Moorhead & Draisen, PA,
of Anderson, and Timothy Alan Nowacki, of The Clardy
Law Firm, P.A., of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action to
determine the validity of the cancellation of an insurance policy. In the appealed
order, the circuit court found the policy at issue had not been canceled based on
two independent grounds: (1) unearned premiums on the policy were not refunded
until after the occurrence for which coverage was sought and (2) the mailing of the
notice of cancellation did not comply with relevant statutory requirements.
ProCentury Insurance Company, the issuer of the policy, challenges both grounds
on appeal. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-39-90 (2015) (setting forth the procedure to cancel an
insurance contract financed by a premium service company with a power of
attorney to cancel the contract); § 38-39-90(e) (requiring, if an insurance contract
is canceled pursuant to this section, that the insurer return unearned premiums to
the premium service company that financed the premium for the account of the
insured); § 38-39-90(f) (requiring, if an insurance contract is canceled pursuant to
this section, that the premium service company promptly refund any surplus over
the amount due from the insured to the insured or the insured's agent of record);
Bowman v. State Roofing Co., 365 S.C. 112, 122, 616 S.E.2d 699, 704 (2005) ("A
return of unearned premiums as required under [section] 38-39-90(e) is in effect
part of [the insurer's] obligation under its policy and is therefore a condition
precedent to an effective cancellation.").

2. Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address all issues on appeal
when its decision on one issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED. 1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.