In the Interest of Malik S.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Interest of Malik S., a Juvenile Under the Age of
Seventeen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001559

Appeal From Richland County
Gwendlyne Y. Jones, Family Court Judge
Monét S. Pincus, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-419
Submitted October 1, 2017 – Filed November 8, 2017

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, and Solicitor
Daniel Edward Johnson, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Brown, 356 S.C. 496, 502, 589 S.E.2d 781, 784 (Ct. App.
2003) ("Generally, the decision to admit an eyewitness identification is in the trial
[court's] discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion, or the commission of prejudicial legal error."); State v. Pagan, 369 S.C.
201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the
conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an
error of law."); State v. Traylor, 360 S.C. 74, 81, 600 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2004) ("A
criminal defendant may be deprived of due process of law through an identification
procedure which is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification."); State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 286, 540 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2000)
("An in-court identification of an accused is inadmissible if a suggestive out-of-
court identification procedure created a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification."); id. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at 447 (stating courts engage in the two-
prong inquiry set forth in Neil v. Biggers1 to determine whether an out-of-court
identification is admissible); Traylor, 360 S.C. at 81, 600 S.E.2d at 526 (stating a
trial court must first "ascertain whether the identification process was unduly
suggestive"); id. at 81, 600 S.E.2d at 526-27 (stating a court must next determine
"whether the out-of-court identification was nevertheless so reliable that no
substantial likelihood of misidentification existed"); Moore, 343 S.C. at 287, 540
S.E.2d at 447-48 ("Only if [the procedure] was suggestive need the court consider
the second question[–]whether there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." (first alteration by court) (quoting Jefferson v. State, 425 S.E.2d
915, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992))); State v. Mansfield, 343 S.C. 66, 78, 538 S.E.2d
257, 263 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony."); Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200 ("[T]he
factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness'[s] degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness'[s] prior description of
the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.").

AFFIRMED.2

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.