DLJ Mortgage Capital v. Amin

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., Respondent,

v.

Ameer A. Amin, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001341

Appeal From Sumter County
Richard L. Booth, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-306
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed July 26, 2017

AFFIRMED

Ameer A. Amin, pro se, of Sumter.

Caroline Richardson Glenn, of Brock & Scott, PLLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ameer A. Amin appeals (1) an order issued by the Sumter
County Master-in-Equity that denied both his motion to vacate a judgment of
foreclosure and sale granted to DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. (DLJ) on DLJ's motion
for summary judgment and his request to continue the hearing on that motion and
(2) a writ of assistance granted to DLJ. On appeal, Amin argues the master erred
in allowing the foreclosure action to proceed in view of (1) DLJ's alleged failure to
rebut Amin's affidavit that there was no original note in existence and (2) Amin's
constitutional challenges to the proceedings. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to any arguments regarding the underlying summary judgment order: Rule
203(b)(1), SCACR ("A notice of appeal shall be served on all respondents within
thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of entry of the order or judgment.");
USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 651, 661 S.E.2d 791, 795
(2008) (stating the failure to serve a notice of appeal within this time divests the
appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction and results in the dismissal of the
appeal).

2. As to any arguments regarding the order denying Amin's motion to vacate the
judgment of foreclosure and sale: Bloody Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashton,
410 S.C. 62, 66, 762 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ct. App. 2014) ("The determination of
whether to set aside a foreclosure sale is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court."); Goodson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 295 S.C. 400, 402, 368 S.E.2d
687, 689 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating Rule 60(b), SCRCP, is applicable when relief
from any final judgment is sought); id. ("Relief under [Rule 60(b)] is within the
sound discretion of the trial [court] and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse
of that discretion.").

3. As to whether a final judgment or decision should have been delayed because of
Amin's constitutional challenges to the proceedings: Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 5.1(c)
("Unless the court sets a later time, the attorney general may intervene within 60
days after the notice is filed or after the court certifies the challenge, whichever is
earlier. Before the time to intervene expires, the court may reject the constitutional
challenge, but may not enter a final judgment holding the statute
unconstitutional.").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.