State v. Andrews

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jerry Jerome Andrews, III, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001176

Appeal From Greenwood County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-073
Submitted December 1, 2016 – Filed February 8, 2017

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William Frederick Schumacher, IV,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo,
of Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jerry Andrews appeals his convictions and concurrent sentences
of four months' imprisonment for resisting arrest and thirty days' imprisonment for
possession of marijuana. On appeal, Andrews argues the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence based upon a Fourth Amendment
violation because (1) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe
Andrews was involved in criminal activity to justify the stop and (2) the officers
did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Andrews was armed and dangerous to
justify the frisk. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to Issue 1: State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 87, 736 S.E.2d 263, 265 (2012)
("When reviewing a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, an appellate court
must affirm the [circuit] court's ruling if there is any evidence to support it; the
appellate court may reverse only for clear error."); U.S. Const. amend. IV
(providing the Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating a person has been
"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "whenever a police officer
accosts [the] individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"); State v.
Woodruff, 344 S.C. 537, 546, 544 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A police
officer may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative
purposes, without treading upon his Fourth Amendment rights, when the officer
has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, short of probable cause
for arrest, that the person is involved in criminal activity."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-
5-3160(a) (2006) ("Where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, it shall
be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.");
Woodruff, 344 S.C. at 546, 544 S.E.2d at 295 ("If the officer's suspicions are
confirmed or are further aroused, the stop may be prolonged and the scope
enlarged as required by the circumstances.").

2. As to Issue 2: Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (providing there is a "search" when a police
officer makes a "careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing . . .
in an attempt to find weapons"); State v. Fowler, 322 S.C. 263, 267, 471 S.E.2d
706, 708 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating even if a Terry stop is proper, "before the police
may frisk a defendant, they must have a reasonable belief the defendant is armed
and dangerous"); id. ("An officer must be able to specify the particular facts on
which he or she based his or her belief the suspect was armed and dangerous.");
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (stating in assessing whether a suspect is armed and
dangerous, "[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger").

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.