Adams v. SCDPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

George M. Adams, #181283, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001561

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-434
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed October 19, 2016

AFFIRMED

George M. Adams, pro se.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of the South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: George M. Adams appeals the Administrative Law Court's
(ALC) order affirming a decision of the South Carolina Department of Probation,
Parole and Pardon Services (the Department) finding Adams was ineligible for
parole because of a prior violent crime conviction. Adams argues the ALC erred in
ruling the Department (1) had the authority to consider his sentencing date, rather
than the date he committed the offense, when determining whether a crime was
classified as violent; (2) did not violate his state and federal constitutional rights
concerning a pre-existing expectation of parole eligibility; and (3) did not
"jurisdictionally restructure" his sentence. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. The ALC properly affirmed the Department's decision finding Adams ineligible
for parole based on a prior violent crime conviction because Adams's prior offense
of first-degree burglary was classified as a violent crime under section 16-1-60 of
the South Carolina Code at the time he committed the offense for which he is
seeking parole. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2015) ("The board must
not grant parole nor is parole authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for a
second or subsequent conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior
conviction, for violent crimes as defined in [s]ection 16-1-60."); Sullivan v. State,
331 S.C. 479, 481, 504 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1998) (finding an inmate ineligible for
parole based on a prior conviction because the prior crime was classified as violent
under section 16-1-60 at the time the inmate committed the offense for which he
was seeking parole); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp. 1992) (classifying first-
degree burglary as a violent crime).2

2. The ALC did not err in finding the Department did not violate any state or
federal constitutional rights concerning Adams's alleged pre-existing expectation
of parole eligibility because section 24-21-640 was in effect at the time Adams
committed his current offense; therefore, Adams was never eligible for parole due
to his prior violent crime conviction. See Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning
Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("Procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty
or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."). Furthermore, the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
2
Even if we were to use the date Adams committed first-degree burglary when
determining whether it was a violent crime for the purposes of determining his
parole eligibility under section 24-21-60, Adams would still be ineligible for parole
because first-degree burglary was also classified as a violent crime at the time he
committed that offense.
ALC properly found there was no ex post facto violation in this case. See Jernigan
v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261, 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto
violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively alters the definition of a
crime or increases the punishment for a crime.").

3. The ALC did not err in finding parole eligibility was not included as part of
Adams's sentence. See Major v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 384
S.C. 457, 465, 682 S.E.2d 795, 799 (2009) ("[A] sentencing court is not authorized
to determine parole eligibility."). Adams mistakenly argues his sentence under
section 16-3-20(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 1992) granted him parole
eligibility after twenty years' imprisonment. Instead, that section restricted his
parole eligibility for a period of twenty years. In Adams's case, after he served
twenty years' imprisonment he was no longer ineligible for parole under section
16-3-20(A); however, he continued to be ineligible under section 24-21-640
because of his prior violent crime conviction.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.