Hilton v. Farmer

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Leslie Nicole Hilton, Respondent,

v.

Brandon Roland Farmer, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000318

Appeal From York County
Wayne M. Creech, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-282
Submitted March 1, 2016 – Filed June 8, 2016

AFFIRMED

Stephen D. Schusterman, of Schusterman Law Firm, of
Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Daniel Dominic D'Agostino, of D'Agostino Law Firm, of
York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307, 310, 384 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1989) ("A
family court has authority to modify the amount of a child support award upon a
showing of a substantial or material change of circumstances."); id. ("The burden is
upon the party seeking the change to prove the changes in circumstances
warranting a modification."); id. at 310, 384 S.E.2d at 717 ("A substantial or
material change in circumstances might result from changes in the needs of the
children or the financial abilities of the supporting parent to pay among other
reasons."); id. ("Generally, however, changes in circumstances within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the initial decree was entered do not
provide a basis for modifying a child support award."); Hailey v. Hailey, 357 S.C.
18, 25, 590 S.E.2d 495, 498 (Ct. App. 2003) ("However, in applying this general
rule, the family court should look not only at whether the parties contemplated the
change, but also 'most importantly whether the amount of [support] in the original
decree reflects the expectation of that future occurrence.'" (quoting Sharps v.
Sharps, 342 S.C. 71, 78, 535 S.E.2d 913, 917 (2000))); Sharps, 342 S.C. at 77, 535
S.E.2d at 916 ("[T]here are some future changes which may be in contemplation of
the parties at the time of the decree but, due to other considerations, cannot be
addressed at that time in the divorce decree."); id. at 78, 535 S.E.2d at 917 (finding
the termination of child support based on the emancipation of the children was a
substantial change that warranted modifying the wife's alimony); id. ("Although
the emancipation of the children was an expected event, the original divorce decree
would not have been able to make a future adjustment in alimony in favor of [the
w]ife because doing so would have required substantial speculation as to future
conditions.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, A.C.J., and SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.