State v. Eady

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Torren Marquize Eady, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000375

Appeal From Charleston County
J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-288
Submitted January 1, 2016 – Filed June 15, 2016

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Torren Marquize Eady appeals his convictions for murder,
attempted murder, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime, arguing the
trial court erred in (1) refusing to charge the jury on mere presence and mere
association and (2) permitting a witness to provide speculative testimony. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on mere
presence and mere association: State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 270, 721
S.E.2d 413, 421-22 (2011) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's]
decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v.
Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010))); State v. James, 386
S.C. 650, 653, 689 S.E.2d 643, 645 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The defendant is entitled to a
mere presence charge if the evidence supports it."); id. at 653-54, 689 S.E.2d at
645 (stating a mere presence charge is applicable when "there is some doubt over
whether a person is guilty of a crime by virtue of accomplice liability" (quoting
State v. Dennis, 321 S.C. 413, 420, 468 S.E.2d 674, 678 (Ct. App. 1996))); id. at
653-54, 689 S.E.2d at 645 (holding a mere presence charge was not warranted
when the State's theory did not involve accomplice liability).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in permitting a witness to provide speculative
testimony: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The
admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); Rule 701, SCRE (stating a lay witness
may testify to opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perception of
the witness, helpful to the determination of a fact in issue, and do not require
special knowledge, skill, experience, or training); State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 455,
463-64, 469 S.E.2d 49, 54 (1996) (finding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting testimony that the victim must have provided the defendant
with bad crack cocaine or broken his crack cocaine because the witness's opinion
was rationally based on the events that transpired and was helpful to the jury's
determination of the defendant's motive).

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.