Vasey v. Colton Builders

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Phil Vasey and Pamela Vasey, Appellants,

v.

Colton Builders, LLC and Collinswood Cabinetry, LLC,
Defendants,

Of whom Colton Builders, LLC is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002633

Appeal From York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-305
Submitted March 1, 2016 – Filed June 22, 2016

AFFIRMED

Phil Vasey and Pamela Vasey, both of Rock Hill, pro se.

F. Craig Wilkerson, Jr., of F. Craig Wilkerson, Jr., LLC,
of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Phil and Pamela Vasey appeal the circuit court's order
confirming an arbitration award in favor of Colton Builders (Colton) arguing there
was no valid arbitration agreement and the award was procured by fraudulent or
undue means. The Vaseys contend the fact Colton had been administratively
dissolved by the Secretary of State voided the arbitration consent order entered into
by the parties, and Colton's failure to inform the Vaseys of the administrative
dissolution constituted fraud or other undue means in the procurement of the
award. Because we find the consent order valid, and there is no evidence that
Colton procured the arbitration award by fraud or other undue means, especially in
light of the undisputed fact Colton was unaware of the administrative dissolution
and has since been reinstated, we affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-130(a)(1), (5) (2005) ("Upon
application of a party, [a] court shall vacate an [arbitration] award where: [t]he
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;" or "[t]here was no
arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings
[to compel or stay arbitration] and the party did not participate in the arbitration
hearing without raising the objection."); Towles v. United HealthCare Corp., 338
S.C. 29, 37, 524 S.E.2d 839, 844 (Ct. App. 1999) ("There is a strong presumption
in favor of the validity of arbitration agreements because of the strong policy
favoring arbitration."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(a) (2005) ("A written
agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration . . . is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-14-210(d) (2006) ("A
corporation dissolved administratively continues its corporate existence but may
not carry on any business except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its
business and affairs under Section 33-14-105 [of the South Carolina Code
(2006)]."); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-14-105(c)(6) (2006) ("Dissolution of a corporation
does not . . . abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation
on the effective date of dissolution. . . ."); S.C. Code Ann § 33-14-220(c) (2006)
("When the reinstatement [of an administratively dissolved corporation] is
effective, it relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of the
administrative dissolution and the corporation resumes carrying on its business as
if the administrative dissolution had never occurred.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.