Shults v. Miller

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Dickie Shults, Appellant,

v.

Angela G. Miller, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000359

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-336
Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed June 29, 2016

AFFIRMED

Samuel Darryl Harms, III, of Harms Law Firm, PA, of
Piedmont, for Appellant.

Robert Eric Davis, of The Ward Law Firm, PA, of
Spartanburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dickie Shults appeals the circuit court's order granting Angela
Miller's motion to set aside an entry of default and her motion for summary
judgment. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in setting aside the entry of default:
Sundown Operating Co., Inc. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 606, 681 S.E.2d
885, 888 (2009) ("The decision whether to set aside an entry of default . . . lies
solely within the sound discretion of the [circuit court]."); id. ("The [circuit] court's
decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that
discretion."); id. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when
the judge issuing the order was controlled by some error of law or when the order,
based upon factual, as distinguished from legal conclusions, is without evidentiary
support."); Williams v. Vanvolkenburg, 312 S.C. 373, 375, 440 S.E.2d 408, 409
(Ct. App. 1994) ("The issue before the [appellate court] . . . is not whether we
believe good cause existed to set aside the default, but rather, whether the [circuit
court's] determination is supportable by the evidence and not controlled by an error
of law."); Rule 55(c), SCRCP ("For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default . . . ."); Sundown, 383 S.C. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("This
standard requires a party seeking relief from an entry of default under Rule 55(c) to
provide an explanation for the default and give reasons why vacation of the default
entry would serve the interests of justice."); id. at 607-08, 681 S.E.2d at 888
("Once a party has put forth a satisfactory explanation for the default, the trial court
must also consider: (1) the timing of the motion for relief; (2) whether the
defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff
if relief is granted."); id. at 609, 681 S.E.2d at 889 ("Although the presence of other
factors, in the totality of the circumstances, may amount to a showing of 'good
cause,' a defendant may not be relieved from the entry of default solely because it
relied to its detriment on a negligent insurance agent.").

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in granting Miller's motion for summary
judgment: Wogan v. Kunze, 379 S.C. 581, 585, 666 S.E.2d 901, 903 (2008)
(stating when reviewing a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, appellate
courts apply the same standard that governs the circuit court); Rule 56(c), SCRCP
(providing summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact"); Wogan, 379 S.C. at 585, 666 S.E.2d at 903 ("In determining
whether triable issues of fact exist[], the evidence and all factual inferences must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.") Nelson v. Piggly
Wiggly Cent., Inc., 390 S.C. 382, 391, 701 S.E.2d 776, 780 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A
plaintiff prosecuting a negligence claim must demonstrate (1) the defendant[] owed

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
her a duty of care; (2) the defendant[] breached that duty by a negligent act or
omission; and (3) she suffered damage as a proximate result of that breach.");
Winburn v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 S.C. 435, 443, 339 S.E.2d 142, 147 (Ct. App.
1985) ("The absence of any one of these elements renders the evidence
insufficient.").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.