In the Matter of the Estate of Geraldine M. Harris

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Estate of Geraldine M. Harris

Patti H. Spring, Appellant,

v.

Harry L. Harris, Jr., as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Geraldine M. Harris, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000426

Appeal From Sumter County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-190
Heard March 8, 2016 – Filed May 4, 2016

AFFIRMED

Stanley Clarence Rodgers, of Law Office of Stanley C.
Rodgers, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Walter Graham Newman, of Walter G. Newman
Attorney at Law, LLC and Thomas E. Player, Jr., of
Player & McMillan, LLC, both of Sumter, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Patti Spring (Daughter) appeals the circuit court's order finding
funds in two joint bank accounts—a National Bank of South Carolina (NBSC)
account and a Wachovia account—were not estate assets of the Estate of Geraldine
Harris (Mother). Daughter argues the circuit court erred in failing to find: (1) she
established the fiduciary relationship between Harry L. Harris, Jr. (Son) and
Mother raised a presumption of undue influence in the creation and funding of the
two accounts; (2) the evidence did not support the probate court's finding that the
NBSC account was free of undue influence; and (3) the record included evidence
to support the probate court's finding that the Wachovia account was not a joint
account with the right to survivorship. We affirm.

As to issues one and two: Our supreme court has not issued a pronouncement
extending the presumption of undue influence to joint bank accounts or squarely
addressed the impact of a fiduciary relationship on the creation of joint bank
accounts with the right of survivorship.1 We decline to decide whether a
presumption of undue influence arises in this context.

Here, irrespective of who had the burden of proof, the essential question is this:
Did the evidence show Son's alleged undue influence over Mother destroyed
Mother's free agency and prevented Mother's exercise of judgment and free choice
in creating the joint accounts?2 See Undue Influence, Black's Law Dictionary 1760
(10th ed. 2014) (defining undue influence as "[t]he improper use of power or trust

1
The circuit court and Daughter applied the analysis outlined for setting aside a
will or deed. See Howard v. Nasser, 364 S.C. 279, 288, 613 S.E.2d 64, 68 (Ct.
App. 2005) (holding a presumption of undue influence arises in contested will
cases involving confidential or fiduciary relationships); Dixon v. Dixon, 362 S.C.
388, 398-99, 608 S.E.2d 849, 854 (2005) (applying the undue influence analysis
outlined for wills in cases concerning conveyance of property involving
confidential relationships).
2
We note that even under the burden shifting scheme Daughter asks this court to
apply, Daughter would have retained the ultimate burden of proof to invalidate the
joint accounts. See Howard, 364 S.C. at 288, 613 S.E.2d at 68-69 ("[I]f the
contestants of a duly executed will provide evidence that a confidential/fiduciary
relationship existed sufficient to raise the presumption, the proponents of the will
must offer evidence in rebuttal. We emphasize that although the proponents of the
will must present evidence in rebuttal, they do not have to affirmatively disprove
the existence of undue influence. Instead, the contestants of the will still retain the
ultimate burden of proof to invalidate the will." (emphasis added)).
in a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective; the
exercise of enough control over another person that a questioned act by this person
would not have otherwise been performed, the person's free agency having been
overmastered"). We find the answer to that question is no. Accordingly, we
affirm. See Neely v. Thomasson, 365 S.C. 345, 349-50, 618 S.E.2d 884, 886
(2005) ("When a probate court proceeding is an action at law, the circuit court and
the appellate court may not disturb the probate court's findings of fact unless a
review of the record discloses there is no evidence to support them.").

As to issue three: We find the probate court erred as a matter of law when it
ordered, "Based on the lack of statement specifically stating that the Wachovia
Bank account (now Wells Fargo) was a survivorship account, . . . said account
should have been a part of the residuary estate and the property of the estate as an
asset thereof." The probate court found as fact "[t]he account with Wachovia Bank
specifically stated that it was a joint account." Therefore, the circuit court did not
err in reversing the probate court's decision as to that account. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 62-6-101(4) (2009) ("'Joint account' means an account payable on request to one
or more of two or more parties (whether 'and', 'or', 'and/or', or any other
designation), whether or not mention is made of any right of survivorship."
(emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-6-104(a) (2009) ("Sums remaining on
deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or
parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is a writing filed with the
financial institution at the time the account is created . . . which indicates a
different intention.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, A.C.J., and KONDUROS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.