Militano-Catanzaro v. Catanzaro

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Stephanie Allyson Militano-Catanzaro, Appellant,

v.

Leonard Vincent Catanzaro, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2011-197967

Appeal From Horry County
Ronald R. Norton, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-018
Heard November 10, 2015 – Filed January 20, 2016

AFFIRMED

Randall K. Mullins, of Mullins Law Firm, P.A., of North
Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.

Leonard Catanzaro, of Loris, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Stephanie Allyson Militano-Cantanzaro (Wife) appeals an order
by the family court that held she was not entitled to alimony, attorney's fees,
guardian ad litem (GAL) fees, or a change in the method of the child support
award. We affirm.
1. We disagree with Wife's argument the family court erred in not awarding her
alimony. See Bodkin v. Bodkin, 388 S.C. 203, 215, 694 S.E.2d 230, 237 (Ct. App.
2010) ("The amount to be awarded for alimony, as well as a determination of
whether a spouse is entitled to alimony, is within the sound discretion of the family
court."); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 529, 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) ("Three
important factors in awarding periodic alimony are (1) the duration of the
marriage; (2) the overall financial situation of the parties, especially the ability of
the supporting spouse to pay; and (3) whether either spouse was more at fault than
the other."); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (2014) (providing factors that must be
considered in the making of an alimony award). We find the family court did not
abuse its discretion in finding alimony was not sustainable in Leonard Vincent
Catanzaro's (Husband's) financial situation as he had less disposable income than
Wife even though she had higher expenses.

2. We disagree with Wife's argument that the family court erred in not changing the
method of the child support award nor its calculation. See Bennett v. Rector, 389
S.C. 274, 281, 697 S.E.2d 715, 719 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A child support award rests
in the discretion of the trial judge [] and will not be altered on appeal absent abuse
of discretion."); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114-4720(A)(1) (Supp. 2015) ("The
guidelines define income as the actual gross income of the parent, if employed to
full capacity, or potential income if unemployed or underemployed."). We find the
family court's chosen method of child support calculation was appropriate and
intended to benefit Wife if Husband received additional bonuses or income despite
its inconvenience to Wife.

3. We agree with the family court that Wife was not entitled to attorney's fees and
GAL fees. See Gartside v. Gartside, 383 S.C. 35, 47, 677 S.E.2d 621, 627 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("An award of attorneys' fees rests within the sound discretion of the
family court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.");
E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992) (providing in
determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs, a family court should
consider the following factors: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's
fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective
financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard
of living"); Shirley v. Shirley, 342 S.C. 324, 341, 536 S.E.2d 427, 436 (Ct. App.
2000) ("An award of [GAL] fees lies within the sound discretion of the [family
court] and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); Payne
v. Payne, 382 S.C. 62, 71, 674 S.E.2d 515, 519 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding the family
court did not abuse its discretion by equally splitting the GAL fees between the
parties). We find the family court properly determined each party should pay their
own attorney's fees and half of the GAL fees based on the financial situation of
each party and the contested nature of the proceedings.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.