Willimon v. Gilstrap

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Matthew H. Willimon, Jr. and Elizabeth Willimon,
Appellants,

v.

Jake Gilstrap, Thomas R. Gilstrap, Sr., John Gilstrap,
Yvonne G. Smith, Jason A. Smith, and Patricia Gilstrap,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001233

Appeal From Pickens County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Special Referee

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-020
Heard December 9, 2015 – Filed January 20, 2016

AFFIRMED

James C. Alexander, of Alexander Law Firm, LLC, of
Pickens, for Appellants.

James McKinley Robinson, of Robinson Law Firm, of
Easley, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Matthew and Elizabeth Willimon (Appellants) appeal an order
by the special referee that held Respondents have a right to use a roadway upon
which Appellants had been deeded an easement by Respondents' predecessor-in-
interest Addie Gilstrap. We affirm.

1. We disagree with Appellants' argument that the special referee erred in failing to
grant Appellants exclusive use of the easement. See Simmons v. Berkeley Elec.
Co-op. Inc., 404 S.C. 172, 179, 744 S.E.2d 580, 584 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The general
rule is that the character of an express easement is determined by the nature of the
right and the intention of the parties creating it."); Hill v. Carolina Power & Light
Co., 204 S.C. 83, 96, 28 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1943) (holding the rights of the easement
owner and the landowner are not absolute but are limited for each to have
reasonable enjoyment); Hundley v. Michael, 413 S.E.2d 296, 298 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992) (stating the term exclusive cannot be interpreted so as to exclude the owner
of the servient property from using it consistent with the purpose of the easement).
Although the term exclusive was used in the easement agreement, the record
demonstrates both Appellants and Respondents used the easement road, Mustang
Drive, during the years after the agreement was filed.

2. We disagree with Appellants' argument the special referee erred in considering
extrinsic evidence outside the easement agreement. See Martin v. Bay, 400 S.C.
140, 149, 732 S.E.2d 667, 673 (Ct. App. 2012) ("If the language in the grant or
reservation is uncertain or ambiguous in any respect, the court may inquire into
and consider all surrounding circumstances, including the construction which the
parties have placed on the language."). In ascertaining the meaning of the term
exclusive, we find the special referee properly determined that all the facts
surrounding the years of usage of Mustang Drive should be considered.

3. As we find the special referee did not err in holding Respondents have a right to
use Mustang Drive, we need not address Appellants' arguments concerning
damages for trespass and attorney's fees. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an
appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination
of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.