State v. Bonham

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Raheem Jamar Bonham, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001364

Appeal From Lexington County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-417
Submitted July 1, 2015 – Filed August 12, 2015

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and
Assistant Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 239, 679 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ct. App.
2009) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. We
are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
This same standard of review applies to preliminary factual findings in determining
the admissibility of certain evidence in criminal cases. In Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases, our review is limited to determining whether any
evidence supports the trial court's finding. Upon such review, an appellate court
may reverse only when the trial court's decision is clear error. Under the 'clear
error' standard, the appellate court will not reverse a trial court's finding of fact
simply because it may have decided the case differently." (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)), aff'd as modified, 392 S.C. 125, 708 S.E.2d 217 (2011);
State v. Taylor, 401 S.C. 104, 108, 736 S.E.2d 663, 665 (2013) ("A trial court's
Fourth Amendment suppression ruling must be affirmed if supported by any
evidence . . . ."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-50 (1978) (finding passengers
of a vehicle did not have an expectation of privacy in the car's glove compartment
or the area under the seat of the car, and the court did not need to determine
whether the search of the car was unlawful); Palacio v. State, 333 S.C. 506, 514,
511 S.E.2d 62, 66 (1999) ("Warrantless searches and seizures are reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when conducted under the authority
of voluntary consent."); State v. Pichardo, 367 S.C. 84, 106, 623 S.E.2d 840, 851-
52 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A trial judge's conclusions on issues of fact regarding
voluntariness will not be disturbed on appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to
be an abuse of discretion."); Corley, 383 S.C. at 240, 679 S.E.2d at 191 ("A police
officer may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative
purposes, without treading upon his Fourth Amendment rights, when the officer
has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, short of probable cause
for arrest, that the person is involved in criminal activity.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.