State v. Floyd

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Martin Dameon Floyd, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002736

Appeal From Dorchester County
Maité Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-362
Submitted May 1, 2015 – Filed July 15, 2015

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of
Summerville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Martin Dameon Floyd appeals his conviction for first-degree
burglary, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
when the trial court found the State presented sufficient evidence from which the
jury could find (1) Floyd possessed the requisite intent to commit a crime at the
time of entry into the subject property and (2) the subject property constituted a
dwelling. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Floyd's motion for a directed
verdict regarding whether the State presented sufficient evidence from which the
jury could find Floyd possessed the requisite intent to commit a crime at the time
of entry: State v. Phillips, 411 S.C. 124, 132, 767 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2014)
("In reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, [the appellate court] must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State."); id. at 133, 767 S.E.2d at 448
("A trial court must deny a directed verdict motion when the State presents . . .
substantial circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant's guilt." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); State v. Lane, 410 S.C. 505, 507, 765 S.E.2d 557, 558
(2014) (stating when there is "any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably
tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate c]ourt must find the case
was properly submitted to the jury" (quoting State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292­
93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006))).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Floyd's motion for a directed
verdict regarding whether the subject property constituted a dwelling: State v.
Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 366, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding when
interpreting a statute "[w]ords must be given their plain and ordinary meaning
without resorting to subtle or forced construction which limits or expands the
statute's operation"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(A) (2003) ("A person is guilty
of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling [at night] without
consent and with intent to commit a crime . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-310(2)
(2003) (defining "dwelling" as "the living quarters of a building which is . . .
normally used for sleeping, living, or lodging by a person"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16­
11-310(1)(a) (2003) (defining "building" as "any structure . . . [w]here any
person . . . lives"); State v. Glenn, 297 S.C. 29, 32, 374 S.E.2d 671, 672 (1988)
("[T]he test of whether a building is a dwelling house turns on whether the
occupant has left with the intention to return."); State v. Evans, 376 S.C. 421, 425,
656 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]hile the temporary absence of occupants
will not prevent a residence from becoming the subject of a burglary, it [is]
required that the occupant leave with the purpose of returning in order for the
[property to constitute a dwelling]."); id. (holding factors such as whether utilities
are still on, and whether the home is ready to be lived in, are included in the
concept of "intention to return").

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, LOCKEMY, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.