Lee v. Padgett

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Candace Lee, Respondent,

v.

Courtney Padgett, Toby Keisler, Alex Huizer, Leslie
Perkins, and Baby Girl Roe, Defendants,

Of Whom Courtney Padgett is the Appellant.

In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000203

Appeal From Richland County
James F. Fraley, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-297
Submitted June 1, 2015 – Filed June 16, 2015

AFFIRMED

Allison Boyd Bullard, of Harling & West, LLC, of
Lexington, for Appellant.

Bonnie P. Horn, of Horn Law Firm, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
Lisa Armstrong, of Columbia, Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: In this adoption case, Courtney Padgett, the birth mother of Baby
Girl Roe (Child), appeals a family court order denying her petition to withdraw
consent for adoption, terminating her parental rights, and granting an adoption to
Candace Lee. On appeal, Padgett argues the family court erred in (1) finding she
voluntarily executed the consent to adopt and denying her request to withdraw the
consent; (2) placing Child in Lee's temporary custody without making a finding
this placement was in Child's best interest; and (3) entering an order of adoption
when Lee failed to prove she was a fit and proper person to care for Child or
adoption was in Child's best interest. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b) and the
following authorities:

As to Issue 1: Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423
(2014) ("[T]his [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own
view of the preponderance of the evidence; however, this broad scope of review
does not require the [c]ourt to disregard the findings of the family court, which is
in a superior position to make credibility determinations."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-
9-350 (2010) ("Withdrawal of any consent or relinquishment is not permitted
except . . . when the court finds that the withdrawal is in the best interests of the
child and that the consent or relinquishment was not given voluntarily or was
obtained under duress or through coercion."); McCann v. Doe, 377 S.C. 373, 384,
660 S.E.2d 500, 506 (2008) ("The burden is on the person seeking to revoke the
consent to show the consent was obtained involuntarily."); Phillips v. Baker, 284
S.C. 134, 137, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1985) (holding the appellant failed to prove
she executed her consent under duress when she signed in the presence of her
parents, her attorney, and a social worker; noting the trend against allowing
withdrawal of consent if adoptive parents have relied on the consent); McCann,
377 S.C. at 385-86, 660 S.E.2d at 507 ("[D]uress is only one consideration, and the
[c]ourt may look to other factors, including the totality of the circumstances, in
making the voluntariness determination."); Johnson v. Horry Cnty. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 298 S.C. 355, 356, 380 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1989) (affirming an order refusing
the withdrawal of consent when Johnson had an eleventh grade education, could
understand the terms of the consent, was not under the influence of any drugs, was
not in an unusually emotional state, and initialed provisions that indicated her
consent was voluntary and not the product of coercion or duress).
As to Issue 2: S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-520(A)(1)(d) (2010) ("[N]otwithstanding any
provision of this section, upon good cause shown, the court in its discretion may
permit the temporary custody and placement of a child with a prospective adoptive
parent before the completion of the preplacement or background investigation and
reports required pursuant to this article.").

As to Issue 3: S.C. Code Ann. § 63-9-750(B)(5) (2010) (providing a family court
shall grant an adoption if it finds the "petitioner is a fit and proper person and able
to care for the child and to provide for the child's welfare"); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-
9-750(B)(6) (providing a family court shall grant an adoption if it finds "the best
interests of the adoptee are served by the adoption"); McCann, 377 S.C. at 389,
660 S.E.2d at 509 ("The best interest of the child remains, always, the paramount
consideration in every adoption." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Phillips, 284
S.C. at 136, 325 S.E.2d at 535 ("In adoption cases the child is the proper focus for
the determination.").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.