Allcare Medical v. Ahava Hospice

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Allcare Medical, LLC, Respondent,

v.

Ahava Hospice, Inc. f/k/a Ascension Hospice Inc.,
Robert A. Williams, and Lancelot D. Wright,
Defendants,

Of whom Ahava Hospice, Inc. f/k/a Ascension Hospice
Inc., and Lancelot D. Wright are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001316

Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-307
Submitted June 1, 2015 – Filed June 24, 2015

AFFIRMED

Darryl D. Smalls, of Darryl D. Smalls, Attorney at Law,
of Columbia, for Appellants.

Alexandre Nicolas MacClenahan, of The MacClenahan
Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Ahava Hospice, Inc. (Ahava) and Lancelot Wright appeal the
circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Allcare Medical, LLC
(Allcare), arguing the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment when (1)
no contract existed between Ahava and Allcare; (2) there is a genuine issue of fact
whether Ahava is a successor in interest to Ascension Hospice, Inc.; and (3) there
is a genuine issue of fact whether the promissory note signed by Wright was void
because of duress. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to Issues 1 and 2: David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 247, 626
S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) ("When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the
appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court."); McNaughton-McKay
Elec. Co. of N.C. v. Andrich, 324 S.C. 275, 279, 482 S.E.2d 564, 566 (Ct. App.
1997) ("Summary judgment is proper when it is clear there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id.
("Summary judgment should be granted when plain, palpable, and undisputable
facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ."); id. ("In determining
whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all inferences which can
be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party."); Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 366 S.C. 308, 312,
622 S.E.2d 213, 215 (2005) ("[I]n the absence of a statute, a successor or
purchasing company ordinarily is not liable for the debts of a predecessor or selling
company unless (1) there was an agreement to assume such debts, (2) the
circumstances surrounding the transaction warrants a finding of a consolidation or
merger of the two corporations, (3) the successor company was a mere
continuation of the predecessor, or (4) the transaction was entered into fraudulently
for the purpose of wrongfully defeating creditors' claims." (footnote omitted)).

2. As to Issue 3: Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 266-67, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("The central question with respect to whether a contract was executed
under duress is whether, considering all the surrounding circumstances, one party
to the transaction was prevented from exercising his free will by threats or the
wrongful conduct of another."); id. at 267, 612 S.E.2d at 475 ("In order to establish
that a contract was procured through duress, three things must be proved: (1)
coercion; (2) putting a person in such fear that he is bereft of the quality of mind
essential to the making of a contract; and (3) that the contract was thereby obtained
as a result of this state of mind."); id. ("The fear which makes it impossible for a
person to exercise his own free will is not so much to be tested by the means
employed to accomplish the act, as by the state of mind produced by the means
invoked."); id. ("Duress is viewed with a subjective test which looks at the
individual characteristics of the person allegedly influenced, and duress does not
occur if the victim has a reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to take
advantage of it.").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.