SCBT, N.A. v. Sand Dollar 31

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

SCBT, N.A., Respondent,

v.

Sand Dollar 31, LLC, and Rhonda Meisner, Defendants,

Of Whom Rhonda Meisner is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213558

Appeal From Richland County
Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-435
Submitted September 1, 2014 – Filed December 3, 2014

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART

Rhonda Meisner, of Blythewood, pro se.

Jason David Wyman and Teri Kimball-Callen Stomski,
both of Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC, of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rhonda Meisner appeals the master-in-equity's two judgments of
foreclosure and denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment. On appeal,
Meisner argues (1) the master erred in awarding attorney's fees; (2) South Carolina
Bank and Trust, N.A. (the Bank) was estopped from valuing the properties less
than the amount stated in the Bank's motion to vacate the judicial sale; (3) the
master erred in allowing the judgments of foreclosure to be entered before the
judicial sale; and (4) the master erred in denying her motion to alter or amend.

At the foreclosure hearing, an employee of the Bank testified to the amount of
attorney's fees Meisner, through her personal guaranties, owed on the defaulted
loans. According to the employee, Meisner owed $6,263 in attorney's fees on one
note; however, the employee did not testify to the amount of attorney's fees
Meisner owed on the other note. Significantly, the Bank did not introduce into
evidence affidavits of attorney's fees.

Subsequently, the master issued orders of foreclosure on both properties and
personal judgments against Meisner based on the guaranty agreements. The orders
required Meisner to pay $8,000 in attorney's fees on one note and $6,000 in
attorney's fees on the other. In the orders, the master found the attorney's fees were
reasonable; however, there is no evidence in the record that the Bank ever filed
affidavits of attorney's fees or that the master ever reviewed affidavits of attorney's
fees in reaching its conclusions.

We find the master abused its discretion in determining the Bank's attorney's fees
were reasonable without first reviewing affidavits of attorney's fees. See U.S. Bank
Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Bell, 385 S.C. 364, 379-80, 684 S.E.2d 199, 207 (Ct. App.
2009) ("Where there is a contract, the award of attorney's fees is left to the
discretion of the trial [court] and will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion
is shown." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Jackson v. Speed, 326
S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E.2d 750, 760 (1997) (providing six factors the master should
consider when determining a reasonable attorney's fee). Accordingly, we remand
this case so the master can award reasonable attorney's fees.

As to Meisner's remaining issues on appeal, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the Bank is estopped from valuing the properties less than the
amount stated in its motion to vacate: Cowburn v. Leventis, 366 S.C. 20, 41, 619
S.E.2d 437, 449 (Ct. App. 2005) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for
appellate review, . . . it must be raised and ruled upon by the trial [court].").

2. As to whether the master erred in allowing the judgment of foreclosure to be
entered prior to the judicial sale: S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-650 (2007) ("The court
may . . . render judgment against the parties liable for the payment of the debt
secured by the mortgage and direct at the same time the sale of the mortgaged
premises."); id. ("Upon the sale of the mortgaged premises the officer making the
sale under the order of the court shall credit upon the judgment so rendered for the
debt the amount paid to the plaintiff from the proceeds of the sale."); Fed. Land
Bank of Columbia v. Davant, 292 S.C. 172, 178, 355 S.E.2d 293, 296 (Ct. App.
1987) (explaining section 29-3-650 "authorizes the court to render judgment
against the parties liable for payment of the debts secured by a mortgage and direct
at the same time the sale of the mortgaged premises" (internal citations omitted)).

3. Except as to attorney's fees, the master did not err in denying the Rule 59(e),
SCRCP, motion to alter or amend: Bank of N.Y. v. Sumter Cnty., 387 S.C. 147,
159, 691 S.E.2d 473, 479 (2010) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for
the first time in a post-trial motion."); MailSource, LLC v. M.A. Bailey & Assocs.,
356 S.C. 370, 374, 588 S.E.2d 639, 641 (Ct. App. 2003) ("A party cannot raise an
issue for the first time in a Rule 59(e), SCRCP[,] motion which could have been
raised at trial.").

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.1

HUFF and SHORT, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.