In the Interest of Shemar V.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Interest of Shemar V., a Juvenile Under the Age of
Seventeen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213220

Appeal From Cherokee County
James F. Fraley, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-179
Submitted April 1, 2014 – Filed April 30, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Shemar V. was adjudicated delinquent by the family court for
third-degree assault and battery. He appeals, arguing (1) the family court
improperly denied his motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to the South Carolina
Protection of Persons and Property Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450
(Supp. 2013), (2) the family court erred by failing to grant his directed verdict
motion, (3) the family court erred by not finding he was acting in self-defense. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to the South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act: In re Jamal
G., 396 S.C. 158, 163, 720 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding in an appeal
from a family court delinquency proceeding that this court reviews errors of law
only); In re John Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 534, 458 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding this court must affirm an adjudication of delinquency unless it is
unsupported by the evidence); State v. Brannon, 379 S.C. 487, 495, 666 S.E.2d
272, 276 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to
determine the intent of the legislature."); id. ("The legislature's intent should be
ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute."); id. at 496, 666
S.E.2d at 276 ("What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the
best evidence of the legislative intent or will."); id. ("The words of a statute must
be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced
construction."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C) (Supp. 2013) ("A person who is
not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in another place where he
has a right to be . . . has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground and
meet force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself . . . or to prevent the
commission of a violent crime as defined in [s]ection 16-1-60." (emphasis added));
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-430(2) (Supp. 2013) (defining great bodily injury as
"bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member or organ"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-450(A) (Supp. 2013) ("A
person who uses deadly force as permitted by the provisions of this article . . . is
justified in using deadly force and is immune from criminal prosecution . . . for the
use of deadly force . . . ."); State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 411, 709 S.E.2d 662,
665 (2011) (stating "when a party raises the question of statutory immunity prior to
trial, the proper standard for the circuit court to use in determining immunity under
the [South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property] Act is a preponderance of
the evidence").

2. As to the directed verdict: State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124,
126-27 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating if a defendant presents evidence after the denial of
his directed verdict motion at the close of the State's case, he must make another
directed verdict motion at the close of all evidence in order to appeal the
sufficiency of the evidence).
3. As to the self-defense argument: State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d
697, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it
must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge. Issues not raised and
ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.