CourtListener 10148346•State v. Glover
Texte intégral
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Tyris Bernard Glover, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2012-211983
Appeal From Richland County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-043
Submitted December 2, 2013 – Filed February 5, 2014
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia,
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Missouri, 361 S.C. 107, 111, 603 S.E.2d 594, 596 (2004)
("When reviewing a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, an appellate court
must affirm the trial [court's] ruling if there is any evidence to support the ruling.");
State v. Morris, 395 S.C. 600, 608, 720 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The
appellate court's task in reviewing the trial court's factual findings on a Fourth
Amendment issue is simply to determine whether any evidence supports the trial
court's findings."); State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 113, 747 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2013)
("A warrantless search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when voluntary consent is given for the search."); id. ("When the defendant
disputes the voluntariness of his consent, the burden is on the State to prove the
consent was voluntary."); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)
("[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances."); id. at 226 (analyzing cases determining
whether consent to search was voluntary and noting no case "turned on the
presence or absence of a single controlling" factor); State v. Wallace, 269 S.C. 547,
552, 238 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1977) (noting a police officer does not have to give
Miranda1 warnings before seeking consent to search); State v. Mattison, 352 S.C.
577, 585, 575 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the defendant's
contention that "the fact that he was 'surrounded' by a drug dog and four police
officers with squad cars flashing blue lights demonstrated a 'show of force' that
indicate[d] coercion").
AFFIRMED.2
FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
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