Woods v. Hinson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mell Woods, Appellant,

v.

John D. Hinson; Christine Jones; John C. Hinson;
William L. Hinson; Lois Hinson; Robert Breakfield, as
Personal representative of the Estate of Reba P. Hinson;
Elaine H. Hensley; Robert H. Hinson; George Stanford,
as Personal Representative of the Estate; Linda H.
Stanford; William C. Hinson, Jr.; Darrell W. Hinson; and
Mary Roe and John Doe, fictitous names used to
designate all other parties, whose names are unknown,
and any and all other persons claiming any right, title,
estate interest or lien upon the real estate described in the
complaint, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212330

Appeal From Chester County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-010
Submitted November 1, 2013 – Filed January 8, 2014

AFFIRMED

Mell Woods, of Lancaster, pro se.
B. Michael Brackett, of Moses & Brackett, PC, of
Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Mell Woods appeals the circuit court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of Respondents. Woods argues the circuit court erred in: (1)
granting summary judgment when issues of material fact remained; (2) denying his
right to a jury trial in violation of section 15-67-100 of the South Carolina Code
(2005); (3) finding Reba Hinson acquired a life estate under Levie Hinson's will;
and (4) finding Reba Hinson, as a life tenant, could not claim adverse possession
against the remaindermen to the life estate. We affirm.1

1. As to issue one and issue three, the circuit court did not err in granting summary
judgment because Woods failed to create a genuine issue as to any material fact.
See S. Glass & Plastics Co., Inc. v. Kemper, 399 S.C. 483, 490, 732 S.E.2d 205,
208-09 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment
motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule
56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
First, no evidence supports Woods's argument that the circuit court applied an
improper standard in granting summary judgment. The circuit court's order does
not specifically state the standard it applied in granting summary judgment. The
circuit court apparently treated the issues presented as questions of law, which was
proper because the interpretation of a will is a question of law to be decided by the
court. See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 901 (2011) ("Generally, the interpretation or
construction of a will, or so much thereof as is applicable to the case under
consideration, is a question of law for the court and not one of fact for the jury . . .
." (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, although Levie Hinson's will was ambiguous,
any ambiguity in the will was a patent ambiguity; therefore, the circuit court
properly resolved the issue as a matter of law. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. United
Nat. Ins. Co., 392 S.C. 506, 526, 709 S.E.2d 85, 95 (Ct. App. 2011) (stating "[a]
patent ambiguity is one that arises upon the words of a will, deed, or contract"); 96
C.J.S. Wills § 901 ("When a patent ambiguity exists in a will, a court must resolve
such ambiguity as a matter of law."); see also United Nat. Ins. Co., 392 S.C. at
526, 709 S.E.2d at 95-96 (recognizing, in the context of an insurance policy, the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
interpretation of a policy with a patent ambiguity is for the court). Furthermore,
Woods's conclusory allegations of title to the property in question are insufficient
to withstand summary judgment. Nelson v. Piggly Wiggly Cent., Inc., 390 S.C.
382, 389, 701 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2010) ("As Rule 56(e), SCRCP, states, a
party 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading[s].'"
(citation omitted)); see also Shupe v. Settle, 315 S.C. 510, 516-17, 445 S.E.2d 651,
655 (Ct. App. 1994) ("A conclusory statement as to the ultimate issue in a case is
not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for purposes of resisting summary
judgment.").

Additionally, the circuit court properly determined Reba Hinson acquired a life
estate under Levie Hinson's will. "The cardinal rule in the construction of any will
is to determine the intent of the testator as gleaned from the written instrument
itself; technical rules or interpretation are subservient to that principle." Wise v.
Poston, 281 S.C. 574, 577, 316 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ct. App. 1984). Here, Levie
Hinson's will states: "I will, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, [Reba
Hinson,] all my real estate, in fee simple, as long as she lives then to our bodily
heirs forever." (emphasis added).

[W]hen a gift is made in one clause of a will in clear and
unequivocal terms, the quality or quantity of the estate
given should not be cut down or qualified by words of
doubtful import found in a subsequent clause. To have
that effect, the subsequent words should be at least as
clear in expressing that intention as the words in which
the interest is given.

Wates v. Fairfield Forest Prods. Co., 210 S.C. 319, 322, 42 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1947)
(emphasis added).

Although Levie Hinson's will uses the term "fee simple," the will also includes
words of limitation indicating Reba Hinson is entitled to the property "as long as
she lives." The words of limitation are not of doubtful import; rather, they are as
clear as the term "fee simple" and demonstrate Levie Hinson's intent to create a life
estate. See Blackmon v. Weaver, 366 S.C. 245, 249, 621 S.E.2d 42, 44 (Ct. App.
2005) (stating no special language is required to create a life estate, rather courts
will look to the intention of the creator of the estate); Epting v. Mayer, 283 S.C.
517, 519, 323 S.E.2d 797, 798 (Ct. App. 1984) ("If the intention of the testator is to
be given effect, as it must be, courts must be permitted . . . to disregard words of
absolute gift and to declare the estate created to be a limited estate where a clear
intention to that effect appears."). Moreover, if we interpreted this will as vesting
Reba Hinson with a fee simple interest in the property, it would require us to
ignore the provision of the will, which provided for a remainder in the parties'
heirs. See Blackmon, 366 S.C. at 250, 621 S.E.2d at 44 (stating "a construction
which gives meaning to all should be preferred over one which renders some
provisions meaningless"). Therefore, because Reba Hinson inherited a life estate
under Levie Hinson's will, any interest Woods acquired in the property from Reba
Hinson extinguished when Reba Hinson died because "a life tenant can convey no
more than his life estate." Poston, 281 S.C. at 579, 316 S.E.2d at 415.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment because
Woods failed to show any genuine issue of material fact.

2. As to whether the circuit court violated section 15-67-100 in denying Woods a
jury trial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Cowburn v. Leventis, 366 S.C. 20, 41, 619 S.E.2d 437, 449 (Ct. App.
2005) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, with few
exceptions, it must be raised and ruled upon by the [circuit court]."); Hickman v.
Hickman, 301 S.C. 455, 456, 392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App. 1990) ("A party
cannot use Rule 59(e)[,SCRCP,] to present to the court an issue the party could
have raised prior to judgment but did not.").

3. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Reba Hinson, as a life tenant,
could not claim adverse possession against the remaindermen to the life estate, we
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Jones v.
Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 10, 681 S.E.2d 6, 11 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The party asserting
adverse possession must show continuous, hostile, open, actual, notorious, and
exclusive possession for a certain period of time."); id. at 15, 681 S.E.2d at 14 ("A
person claiming adverse possession must have personally held the property for ten
years, and tacking is allowed only between ancestor and heir." (emphasis added));
Phipps v. Hardwick, 273 S.C. 17, 25, 253 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1979) ("[A]dverse
possession . . . cannot run against remaindermen until the death of the life tenant.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.