Stanley v. Stanley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James Barry Stanley, Appellant,

v.

Sherl Anne Stanley, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212060

Appeal From Kershaw County
Dana A. Morris, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-418
Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed November 13, 2013

AFFIRMED

John W. Wells, of Baxley, Pratt & Wells, P.A., of
Lugoff, for Appellant.

Sherl Anne Stanley, of Cassatt, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the family court erred in failing to include the home located on
Hagood Street in the marital estate for purposes of equitable distribution: Jamar v.
Jamar, 308 S.C. 265, 267, 417 S.E.2d 615, 616 (Ct. App. 1992) ("The proper date
to value marital property is the time the marital litigation is filed or commenced.");
Arnal v. Arnal, 363 S.C. 268, 293, 609 S.E.2d 821, 834 (Ct. App. 2005)
("[H]owever, both parties are entitled to share in any appreciation or depreciation
that occurs to marital property after separation but before divorce."), cert. granted
on other grounds, 371 S.C. 10, 636 S.E.2d 864 (2006); Dixon v. Dixon, 334 S.C.
222, 228, 512 S.E.2d 539, 542 (Ct. App. 1999) ("It is an unfortunate reality that,
given the volume of cases handled by our family courts, there often is a substantial
delay between the commencement of an action and its ultimate resolution."); id.
("Thus, it is not unusual for the value of the marital assets to change, sometimes
substantially, between the time the action was commenced and its final
resolution."); id. ("In such a case, the family court has the ability to consider the
post-filing appreciation or depreciation when valuing and apportioning the marital
estate."); Brown v. Brown, 379 S.C. 271, 282, 665 S.E.2d 174, 180 (Ct. App. 2008)
(finding both parties were at fault in allowing a timeshare to fall into foreclosure
and holding the family court erred in assessing the value of the timeshare solely
against the husband).

2. As to whether the family court erred in failing to value the equity of the home
located on Hagood Street as of the date of filing rather than the date of the final
hearing: Jamar, 308 S.C. at 267, 417 S.E.2d at 616 ("The proper date to value
marital property is the time the marital litigation is filed or commenced."); Arnal,
363 S.C. at 293, 609 S.E.2d at 834 ("[H]owever, both parties are entitled to share
in any appreciation or depreciation that occurs to marital property after separation
but before divorce."); Dixon, 334 S.C. at 228, 512 S.E.2d at 542 ("It is an
unfortunate reality that, given the volume of cases handled by our family courts,
there often is a substantial delay between the commencement of an action and its
ultimate resolution."); id. ("Thus, it is not unusual for the value of the marital
assets to change, sometimes substantially, between the time the action was
commenced and its final resolution."); id. ("In such a case, the family court has the
ability to consider the post-filing appreciation or depreciation when valuing and
apportioning the marital estate."); Brown, 379 S.C. at 282, 665 S.E.2d at 180
("[W]hen one party is at fault in causing the diminishment in value of the property,
that depreciation may be assessed against the at-fault party."); McDavid v.
McDavid, 333 S.C. 490, 495, 511 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1999) ("[C]ourts have
generally held one spouse chargeable only where he/she acts in bad faith with an
intent to deprive the other spouse of marital assets."); Panhorst v. Panhorst, 301
S.C. 100, 105, 390 S.E.2d 376, 379 (Ct. App. 1990) ("The [equitable distribution]
statute embodies the [l]egislature's decision that the marital estate must be
identified as of a fixed date."); id. ("By requiring the estate to be identified as of
the date marital litigation is filed, the [l]egislature has elected to foreclose the
spouses from litigating every expenditure or transfer of property during the
marriage.").

3. As to whether the family court erred in failing to value the equity of the home
located on Alice Drive as of the date of filing rather than the date of the final
hearing: Buist v. Buist, 399 S.C. 110, 124, 730 S.E.2d 879, 886 (Ct. App. 2012)
("In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised to and ruled upon by the
[family] court."); McDavid, 333 S.C. at 497, 511 S.E.2d at 368-69 (finding the
husband's argument that the family court erred in valuing the marital home at the
time of filing rather than the time of the final hearing was not preserved because
the husband did not raise that issue in his rehearing petition).

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.