McCarson v. Roldan

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Michael Wayne McCarson, Respondent,

v.

Mary Carmen Roldan, Appellant.

In re: Mary Carmen Roldan, Plaintiff,

v.

Michael Wayne McCarson, Defendant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-202190

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-361
Submitted August 1, 2013 – Filed October 2, 2013

AFFIRMED

Raymond W. Godwin and Julie M. Rau, both of
Raymond W. Godwin, Attorney at Law, PC, of
Greenville, for Appellant.

Michael Wayne McCarson, of Cleveland, Ohio, pro se.
PER CURIAM: Mary Carmen Roldan (Mother) appeals the family court's order
finding her in contempt and refusing to find Michael Wayne McCarson (Father) in
contempt. Mother also appeals the family court's award of attorney's fees and costs
to Father. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to the finding of contempt against Mother: Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C.
412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, this
[c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381,
384, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011) ("However, this broad scope of review does not
require [the appellate c]ourt to disregard the findings of the family court."); Miller
v. Miller, 375 S.C. 443, 454, 652 S.E.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Contempt
results from the willful disobedience of an order of the court."); id. at 454, 652
S.E.2d at 759 (holding a willful act is "'done voluntarily and intentionally with the
specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to
do something the law requires to be done . . . .'" (quoting Widman v. Widman, 348
S.C. 97, 119, 557 S.E.2d 693, 705 (Ct. App. 2001))); id. at 457, 652 S.E.2d at 761
(holding civil contempt is characterized by the contemnor's ability to purge himself
whereas criminal contempt is unconditional and may not be purged); id. (holding
civil contempt is proved by clear and convincing evidence whereas criminal
contempt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568,
571-72, 611 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Intent for purposes of criminal
contempt is subjective, not objective, and must necessarily be ascertained from all
the acts, words, and circumstances surrounding the occurrence."); Brandt v.
Gooding, 368 S.C. 618, 628, 630 S.E.2d 259, 264 (2006) ("Direct contempt
involves contemptuous conduct in the presence of the court."); id. ("A person may
be found guilty of direct contempt if the conduct interferes with judicial
proceedings, exhibits disrespect for the court, or hampers the parties or
witnesses."); id. ("Direct contempt that occurs in the court's presence may be
immediately adjudged and sanctioned summarily."); Rhoad v. State, 372 S.C. 100,
106, 641 S.E.2d 35, 37-38 (Ct. App. 2007) (upholding the imposition of two six-
month sentences of imprisonment after the trial court found the appellant in direct
contempt twice).

2. As to the failure to find Father in contempt: Reiss v. Reiss, 392 S.C. 198, 205,
708 S.E.2d 799, 803 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Because this is an issue of credibility, and
the family court was in a better position than this court to judge the witness's
credibility, we defer to the family court's findings."); Bodkin v. Bodkin, 388 S.C.
203, 212, 694 S.E.2d 230, 235 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Because the family court is in a
superior position to judge the witnesses' demeanor and veracity, its findings should
be given broad discretion.").

3. As to the award of attorney's fees and costs to Father: Lindsay v. Lindsay, 328
S.C. 329, 345-46, 491 S.E.2d 583, 592 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he decision to deny
attorney fees is largely discretionary with the trial court and its decision will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); id. at 345, 491 S.E.2d at
592 ("A compensatory contempt award may include attorney fees."); Miller, 375
S.C. at 463, 652 S.E.2d at 764 ("In a civil contempt proceeding, a contemnor may
be required to reimburse a complainant for the costs he incurred in enforcing the
court's prior order, including reasonable attorney's fees."); id. ("The award of
attorney's fees is not a punishment but an indemnification to the party who
instituted the contempt proceeding.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.