State v. Couch

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Michael L. Couch, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-203927

Appeal From Oconee County
Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-313
Heard June 13, 2013 – Filed July 10, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jennifer Ellis Roberts, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael L. Couch appeals his conviction for assault and battery
of a high and aggravated nature, criminal domestic violence of a high and
aggravated nature, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting a written statement into
evidence despite the writer's invocation of the spousal communications privilege
and pursuant to Rule 613(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence: State v.
Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2006) ("The admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion
accompanied by probable prejudice."); State v. Govan, 320 S.C. 392, 395, 465
S.E.2d 574, 575 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A communication is defined as '[i]nformation
given; the sharing of knowledge by one with another . . . a deliberate interchange
of thoughts or opinions between two or more persons.' The physical acts of an
assault cannot be considered communications." (citation omitted)(alterations by
Court)); Rule 613(b), SCRE ("If a witness does not admit that he has made the
prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such statement is admissible.
However, if a witness admits making the prior statement, extrinsic evidence that
the prior statement was made is inadmissible."); State v. Miller, 262 S.C. 369, 371,
204 S.E.2d 738, 738-39 (1974) (affirming the admission of extrinsic evidence
when the witness admitted signing a statement but when confronted with a portion
of the statement said "I don't remember"); State v. Blalock, 357 S.C. 74, 80, 591
S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Generally, where the witness has responded
with anything less than an unequivocal admission, trial courts have been granted
wide latitude to allow extrinsic evidence proving the statement. For example, a
witness's failure to fully recall her prior statement has been found to be a sufficient
denial to allow extrinsic evidence.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in failing to sever the cases involving each
of the victims: State v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 350, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Ct.
App. 2002) ("A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. The court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
that discretion." (citations omitted)); id. at 350, 573 S.E.2d at 860 ("Where the
offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving
connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character, the trial judge
has the power, in his discretion, to order the indictments tried together if the
defendant's substantive rights would not be prejudiced."); id. ("Offenses are
considered to be of the same general nature where they are interconnected.").

AFFIRMED.
HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.