Brown v. SCPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Phillip Brown, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2011-203266

Appeal From the Administrative Law Court
John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-233
Submitted April 1, 2013 – Filed June 5, 2013

AFFIRMED

Phillip Brown, pro se.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of the South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 379 S.C. 411, 417, 665 S.E.2d 231, 234
(Ct. App. 2008) ("In an appeal of the final decision of an administrative agency,
the standard of appellate review is whether the AL[C]'s findings are supported by
substantial evidence."); id. ("In determining whether the AL[C]'s decision was
supported by substantial evidence, this court need only find, considering the record
as a whole, evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion that the AL[C] reached."); James v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole &
Pardon Servs., 376 S.C. 392, 396, 656 S.E.2d 399, 401 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[A]n
inmate has a liberty interest in gaining access to the parole board, although there is
no protected right to parole."); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) ("There is a crucial distinction between being
deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty
that one desires."); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981) (holding no
liberty interest or due process protections were implicated when an inmate was
initially granted parole but the order was rescinded at a later meeting without
providing the inmate a hearing); id. at 17 ("We do not doubt that respondent
suffered 'grievous loss' upon [the board's] rescission of his parole."); id. ("But we
have previously 'reject[ed] . . . the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a
person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due
Process Clause.'" (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976))); id. at 19
("We would severely restrict the necessary flexibility of . . . parole authorities were
we to hold that any one of their myriad decisions with respect to individual inmates
may . . . give rise to protected 'liberty' interests which could not thereafter be
impaired without a constitutionally mandated hearing under the Due Process
Clause.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.