John Pendarvis v. SCLD

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

John Pendarvis and Lawton Drew, Respondents,

v.

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and South
Carolina Department of Agriculture, Defendants,

Of which South Carolina Law Enforcement Division is
the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002006

Appeal From Marion County
William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-143
Heard February 15, 2023 – Filed April 5, 2023
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled May 24, 2023

AFFIRMED

Joel Steve Hughes, of The Law Office of Kenneth E.
Berger, LLC; and Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann
Law Firm, P.A., both of Columbia, for Appellant.

C. Bradley Hutto, of Williams & Williams, of
Orangeburg; and Patrick James McLaughlin, of Wukela
Law Office, of Florence, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appeals
the circuit court's order granting a preliminary injunction that allowed John
Pendarvis and Lawton Drew (collectively, Respondents) to harvest and sell a crop
of hemp. SLED asserts the circuit court erred because (1) the preliminary
injunction failed to maintain the status quo or balance the parties' equities, (2) the
crop was contraband per se, (3) the facts as pled did not support granting the
preliminary injunction, and (4) the circuit court refused to enforce a portion of the
participation agreement between Pendarvis and the South Carolina Department of
Agriculture (SCDA) that permitted SLED to destroy noncompliant crops. We
affirm.

On September 26, 2019, the circuit court issued an Ex Parte Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction that "temporarily restrained and
preliminarily enjoined" SLED and SCDA from entering onto Drew's property to
destroy the contested crop. Following a hearing, the circuit court issued an order
on November 8, 2019 that left the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in place until the pending litigation's resolution. 1 The circuit court's
order also authorized Respondents to "exercise reasonable and necessary farming
practices" to harvest and sell the hemp crop and required any proceeds to be held in
trust until the litigation's resolution. Respondents have harvested but not sold the
crop. 2

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001) ("The
sole object of a temporary injunction is to preserve the subject of the controversy
in its condition at the time of the order until opportunity is offered for full and
deliberate trial investigation."); Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 392 S.C. 361, 366,

1
The underlying litigation revolves around whether Respondents violated the
participation agreement. This appeal deals solely with whether the circuit court
erred in granting the injunction that held that litigation in abeyance.
2
At oral argument, counsel had several opportunities to state that the crop had not
been sold as authorized by the injunction. Our previous opinion dismissed this
appeal as moot because the crop had been sold. Once that opinion was filed,
counsel informed the court that the crop had in fact not been sold. We substitute
this opinion in light of that clarification.
709 S.E.2d 639, 642 (2011) ("The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm to the party requesting it.");
Id. (noting that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish "(1) he will
suffer immediate, irreparable harm without the injunction; (2) he has a likelihood
of success on the merits; and (3) he has no adequate remedy at law.").

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.