United States v. Edgar Payton

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

United States of America, Respondent,

v.

Edgar Payton; Willie Payton; Hattie Payton; F. Hamilton
Dicks, III; the United States of America, acting through
the Small Business Administration, successors in interest
to Still & Williams, Inc.; SC Electric & Gas Co.; and
David Payton, Defendants,

Of whom Edgar Payton is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001678

Appeal From Barnwell County
Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-196
Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed May 24, 2023

AFFIRMED

Daniel Webster Williams, of Bedingfield & Williams, of
Barnwell, for Appellant.

Walker H. Willcox and Katherine McLean Ryan, both of
Willcox Buyck & Williams, PA, of Florence, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this foreclosure action, Edgar Payton appeals an order of the
circuit court, arguing the circuit court erred by (1) striking his demand for a jury
trial, (2) striking his codefendants' demand for a jury trial, and (3) finding his
statute of limitations defense was not applicable to actions brought by the United
States of America. We affirm.

1. We find Payton's counterclaim for discrimination was permissive because it did
not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the USA's foreclosure action,
and the USA's right to enforce the notes and foreclose on the mortgages would not
be affected even if Payton's counterclaim were successful. Thus, we hold the
circuit court did not err by striking Payton's demand for a jury trial. See Carolina
First Bank v. BADD, LLC, 414 S.C. 289, 292, 778 S.E.2d 106, 108 (2015)
("Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law, which [an appellate
court] reviews de novo . . . ."); Johnson v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 292 S.C. 51, 56, 354
S.E.2d 895, 897 (1987) (providing a defendant in a foreclosure action is entitled to
a jury trial only if his counterclaim is legal and compulsory); C & S Real Est.
Servs., Inc. v. Massengale, 290 S.C. 299, 301, 350 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1986) (stating
a counterclaim is permissive when it does not arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the plaintiff's claim), modified by Johnson, 292 S.C. at 55-56, 354
S.E.2d at 897; Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 330 n.7,
755 S.E.2d 437, 442 n.7 (2014) (stating a counterclaim is compulsory only "[i]f the
defendant's prevailing on his counterclaim would affect the [lender]'s right to
enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage").

2. We find Payton lacks standing to appeal the circuit court's striking of his
codefendants' demands for a jury trial. See Lennon v. S.C. Coastal Council, 330
S.C. 414, 415, 498 S.E.2d 906, 906 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A threshold inquiry for any
court is a determination of justiciability, i.e., whether the litigation presents an
active case or controversy."); id. at 415-16, 498 S.E.2d at 906 ("No justiciable
controversy is presented unless the [appellant] has standing to maintain the action."
(quoting Brock v. Bennett, 313 S.C. 513, 519, 443 S.E.2d 409, 413 (Ct. App.
1994))); Rule 201(b), SCACR ("Only a party aggrieved by an order, judgment,
sentence or decision may appeal."); Shaw v. City of Charleston, 351 S.C. 32, 36,
567 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ct. App. 2002) ("[A] party is aggrieved by a
judgment . . . when it operates on [the party's] rights of property or bears directly
on his or her interest." (quoting Beaufort Realty Co., Inc. v. Beaufort County., 346
S.C. 298, 301, 551 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ct. App. 2001))); id. ("The word 'aggrieved'
refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right, or the
imposition on a party of a burden or obligation." (quoting Beaufort Realty Co., 346
S.C. at 301, 551 S.E.2d at 589)).

3. We find the circuit court did not err by ruling Payton's statute of limitations
defense was not applicable to the USA's foreclosure action because Payton argued
the merits of his statute of limitations defense to the circuit court without objection.
See Salvo v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 274 S.C. 34, 39, 260 S.E.2d 708,
711 (1979) (holding the circuit court did not err by issuing an order that exceeded
the defendant's notice of motion because the appellant "fully argued the issues
without objection at the hearing").

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., and HILL, A.J. concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.