State v. Coleman

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ralph Bernard Coleman, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-181966

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-001
Heard November 13, 2012 – Filed January 2, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of
Orangeburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Ralph Coleman appeals his convictions of armed robbery,
burglary, and murder. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his
motion for severance; (2) denying his motion to suppress a witness's identification
of him; and (3) denying his motion to suppress a photograph of a rifle. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Coleman's motion for severance:
State v. Spears, 393 S.C. 466, 475, 713 S.E.2d 324, 328 (Ct. App. 2011) ("'A
motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.'"
(quoting State v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 350, 573 S.E.2d 856, 860 (Ct. App.
2002))); id. at 475, 713 S.E.2d at 328-29 ("Where the offenses charged in separate
indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions
closely related in kind, place and character, the trial [court] has the power, in [its]
discretion, to order the indictments tried together if the defendant's substantive
rights would not be prejudiced."); State v. Halcomb, 382 S.C. 432, 439, 676 S.E.2d
149, 152 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Criminal defendants who are jointly tried for murder
are not entitled to separate trials as a matter of right.); State v. Dennis, 337 S.C.
275, 281, 523 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1999) ("The general rule allowing joint trials
applies with equal force when a defendant's severance motion is based upon the
likelihood he and a codefendant will present mutually antagonistic defenses, i.e.,
accuse one another of committing the crime."); State v. Smith, 387 S.C. 619, 625-
26, 693 S.E.2d 415, 418-19 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding the loss of the right to have
the last closing argument is not a ground upon which to grant severance);
Hughes v. State, 346 S.C. 554, 559, 552 S.E.2d 315, 317 (2001) (holding the trial
court should grant a severance "only when there is a serious risk that a joint trial
would compromise a specific trial right of a co-defendant or prevent the jury from
making a reliable judgment about a co-defendant's guilt" (emphasis omitted)).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Coleman's motion to suppress a
witness's identification: Rule 602, SCRE ("A witness may not testify to a matter
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter."); State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 455, 463, 469
S.E.2d 49, 54 (1996) ("The opinion or inference of a lay witness is admissible if it
is a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, b) helpful to the
determination of a fact in issue, and c) does not require special knowledge."); State
v. Washington, 323 S.C. 106, 110, 473 S.E.2d 479, 481 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating the
admission of pretrial identification evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that
discretion); State v. Singleton, 395 S.C. 6, 13, 716 S.E.2d 332, 335-36 (Ct. App.
2011) ("To warrant reversal based on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the
appellant must prove both the error of the ruling and the resulting prejudice, i.e.,
that there is a reasonable probability the jury's verdict was influenced by the
challenged evidence or the lack thereof.").

3. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Coleman's motion to suppress the
photograph of a rifle: State v. Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 290, 676 S.E.2d 690, 697
(2009) ("The relevancy, materiality, and admissibility of photographs as evidence
are matters left to the sound discretion of the trial court."); id. ("If the offered
photograph serves to corroborate testimony, it is not an abuse of discretion to
admit it."); id. ("To constitute unfair prejudice, the photographs must create an
undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one."); State v. Singleton, 395 S.C. 6, 13, 716 S.E.2d
332, 335-36 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To warrant reversal based on the admission or
exclusion of evidence, the appellant must prove both the error of the ruling and the
resulting prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the jury's verdict was
influenced by the challenged evidence or the lack thereof.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.