JP Morgan v. Army

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association,
Respondent,

v.

Wendy A. Army and Francis X. Army,

Of whom Francis X. Army is, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2010-163727

Appeal From Richland County
Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-414
Submitted July 2, 2012 – Filed July 11, 2012

AFFIRMED

Francis X. Army, pro se, of Eastover.

John Judson Hearn, of Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC,
of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Army's motion for a continuance:
Plyler v. Burns, 373 S.C. 637, 650, 647 S.E.2d 188, 195 (2007) ("The grant or
denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial [court] and is
reviewable on appeal only when an abuse of discretion appears from the record.");
id. ("[T]he denial of a motion for a continuance on the ground that [a party] has not
had time to prepare is rarely disturbed on appeal."); Hudson v. Blanton, 282 S.C.
70, 74, 316 S.E.2d 432, 434 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting a moving party must show the
absence of some material evidence and due diligence on his part to obtain such
evidence to justify a continuance); Beasley v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 273 S.C.
523, 532, 257 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1979) (finding a movant failed to show due
diligence to justify a continuance when he had eight months from filing of the
complaint until trial to prepare).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting duplicates of the loan
documents: Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 25-26, 609 S.E.2d
506, 509 (2005) ("[T]he admission or exclusion of evidence in general is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. . . . An abuse of discretion occurs when the
ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary
support. . . . To warrant reversal based on the admission or exclusion of evidence,
the appellant must prove both the error of the ruling and the resulting prejudice,
i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the . . . verdict was influenced by the
challenged evidence or the lack thereof." (citations omitted)).

3. As to the remaining issues: Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d
731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate
review.").

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.