Miller v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Zachary V. Miller, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2009-122127

Appeal From Greenville County
John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-436
Heard April 11, 2012 – Filed July 18, 2012

REVERSED and REMANDED

Kirby R. Mitchell and Michael S. Gambrell, of South
Carolina Legal Services, of Greenville, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General T. Stephen Lynch, and Assistant
Attorney General Adam L. Whitsett, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Zachary Miller (Miller) appeals the circuit court's order granting
the State's motion to dismiss his declaratory judgment action, arguing the circuit
court erred in (1) finding the State was not properly served; (2) finding Miller
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (3) removing the
Attorney General as a party from the case; and (4) concluding Miller's claim
should be raised to the Administrative Law Court (ALC). We reverse and remand
pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to Miller's right to a hearing, which was requested by both parties, on his
constitutional challenge: See Dangerfield v. State, 376 S.C. 176, 179, 656
S.E.2d 352, 353-54 (2008) ("Due process considerations apply in contested
cases or hearings which affect an individual's property or liberty interests as
contemplated by the federal and state constitutions. The procedural component
of the state and federal due process clauses requires the individual whose
property or liberty interests are affected to have received adequate notice of the
proceeding, the opportunity to be heard in person, the opportunity to introduce
evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the
right to meaningful judicial review.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 284, 294 S.E.2d
781, 782 (1982) ("We believe that an order substantially affecting a party's
rights should not be made in a case without notice to the party prejudiced by it
and an opportunity to be heard.") (emphasis added).

2. Because we reverse the circuit court's order of dismissal for failure to conduct a
hearing, we need not reach the remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its
determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.