Roberson v. Roberson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. 
IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Varanda Odom Roberson,       
Appellant,

v.

Christopher Roberson,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Aiken County

Peter R. Nuessle, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-074

Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed January
31, 2005

AFFIRMED

Vicki Johnson Snelgrove, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Christopher Roberson and Patricia Thomas James, both of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this domestic action, Varanda
Roberson appeals the family court’s failure to recognize her relationship with
Christopher Roberson as a common law marriage.  We affirm. [1]

FACTS

Varanda and Christopher Roberson’s relationship began with the pair
dating in high school.  After conceiving a child in 1992, Varanda and Christopher
moved in together, living in this capacity for approximately ten years interrupted
only by two periods of separation.  During this period of cohabitation, the
parties had four more children.  Sometime during the relationship, Varanda began
using “Roberson” as her surname and Christopher’s family once listed her as
his spouse in an obituary.  School records for the children, who were all named
“Roberson,” listed the parties as “Mr. and Mrs. Roberson.” Christopher sent
flowers addressing her as Varanda Roberson and the two registered for a vacation
under the name of Roberson. 

In January 2003, Christopher left the
home he shared with Varanda and the children.  Varanda brought an action in
March 2003 seeking custody of the children, child support, alimony, and equitable
division of the marital assets.  After a temporary hearing deciding custody,
visitation, and child support, the family court bifurcated the issues at trial
with the intention to hear initially only the common law marriage issue.  After
a trial, the family court found that no common law marriage existed and therefore
the court lacked authority to divide the property.  Varanda appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue of common law marriage sounds
in law. Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. English, 295 S.C. 511, 513, 369 S.E.2d
395, 396 (Ct. App. 1988).  Our review in this case is limited to a determination
of whether or not there is any evidence to support the findings of the trial
judge. Weathers v. Bolt, 293 S.C. 486, 488, 361 S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ct.
App. 1987). Because this action sounds in law, and the existence of a common
law marriage is a question of fact, this court is bound by the lower court’s
factual findings, and its credibility determinations. Barker v. Baker,
330 S.C. 361, 370, 499 S.E.2d 503, 508 (Ct. App. 1998). We must affirm if any
evidence supports the lower court’s findings. Tarnowski v. Lieberman,
348 S.C. 616, 619, 560 S.E.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 2002).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Varanda argues that the trial court committed
error by failing to recognize a common law marriage existed with Christopher. 
We disagree.

Section 20-7-420(5) of the South Carolina
Code (1985) grants the family court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
the validity of marriages.  “In South Carolina, a common-law marriage exists
if the parties intend to enter into a marriage contract.”  Barker at
367, 499 S.E.2d at 506.  “It is essential to a common law marriage that there
shall be a mutual agreement between the parties to assume toward each other
the relation of husband and wife.  Cohabitation without such an agreement does
not constitute marriage.”  Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542, 550, 112
S.E.2d 647, 651 (1960).  “A valid common law marriage requires that the facts
and circumstances show an intention on the part of both parties to enter into
a marriage contract.”  Owens v. Owens, 320 S.C. 543, 545, 466 S.E.2d
373, 375 (Ct. App. 1996).  The party claiming a common law marriage must prove
it by a preponderance of the evidence.  Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 280 S.C.
546, 551, 314 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ct. App. 1984).  However, direct evidence of
the parties’ intent is not often available, thus the existence of a common-law
marriage is frequently proved by circumstantial evidence.  Barker at
367-368, 499 S.E.2d at 507.  Typically, the circumstantial evidence relied upon
to prove a common-law marriage is the amount of time a couple has lived together
and whether the couple publicly held themselves out as husband and wife.  Id. 
“While the presumption of marriage from cohabitation and reputation is ordinarily
a rebuttable presumption, the degree of proof to overcome it is generally very
high, especially where the parties have cohabitated as husband and wife for
a long time.”  Owens, 320 S.C. at 546, 466 S.E.2d at 375.  “The presumption
of marriage can be dispelled only by evidence which is ‘clear, distinct and
satisfactory.’” Id. (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 167,
177 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1970)). 

The family court determined that Christopher presented
sufficient evidence that rebutted the presumption of marriage to overcome evidence
of the couple’s long period of cohabitation.  The court found several facts
of their behavior important: Christopher neglected to place Varanda’s name on
the deed or mortgage to a new house he bought, his job health insurance covered
his children, but not Varanda, and the parties never established joint ownership
of property or joint assets.  The court found and the record supports the notion
that although Christopher knew Varanda had taken his surname, he was not pleased
with the fact and even proposed marriage to her on two occasions, evincing his
belief that the parties were not married.  As this is an action at law, we are
bound by the family court’s findings of fact unless they are without evidence
to support them and we find that in the instant case, sufficient evidence exists.

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, STILWELL, and SHORT JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.