State v. Thomas

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT
AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Quasay Yusas Thomas,
Appellant.

Appeal From Union County

 Lee S. Alford, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion
No. 2004-UP-300

Submitted February 20, 2004
– Filed May 5, 2004

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender
Aileen P. Clare, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Deputy Director for Legal
Services Teresa A. Knox; Legal Counsel Tommy Evans, Jr.; and Legal Counsel
J. Benjamin Aplin, S.C. Dept. of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services,
all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Quasay Yusas
Thomas appeals the revocation of his probation.  We affirm.

Thomas pled guilty on April 25, 2002
to contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  He had been indicted for criminal
sexual conduct with a minor, second degree.  The plea court sentenced him to
a three-year term of imprisonment, but suspended the sentence upon his service
of six months imprisonment or the payment of a three-hundred-dollar fine and
the service of two-years probation.

Twelve months later, following the
issuance of a probation citation charging Thomas with violating the terms of
his probation, the sentencing court conducted a hearing on May 15, 2003 and
revoked his probation in full.  The probation citation cited Thomas, inter
alia, with failing to report in December, January, and February to his
probation officer as instructed, testing positive for marijuana on March 25,
2003 for the third time, and failing to pay a court-ordered fine and a supervision
fee, all in violation of the conditions of his probation.  With particular reference
to his using marijuana, Thomas stated in response to a question from the sentencing
court as to whether he could pass a drug test, “Well, sir, I haven’t smoked
any marijuana in a month.”  Among the standard conditions of Thomas’ probation,
which the sentencing court found he violated, was the condition that requires
a probationer to “refrain from the violations of any state or federal penal
laws.” S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-430(1) (Supp. 2003). 

We decide this case without oral
argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR, and affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2),
SCACR, because the challenge leveled by Thomas at the revocation of his probation
is manifestly without merit. See State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642,
647, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the decision to revoke probation
is committed to the discretion of the sentencing court and the review of the
court of appeals is limited to correcting errors of law unless the lack of a
legal or factual basis indicated the sentencing judge acted arbitrarily or capriciously);
Barlet v. State, 288 S.C. 481, 483, 343 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1986) (“Probation
may not be revoked solely on the ground the probationer failed to pay
fines or to make restitution.”); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1561, at 154
(1989) (“A violation of the terms, or even one of the terms, of probation is
sufficient ground for revocation” and “[a] judge may revoke probation when reasonably
satisfied that a state . . . law has been violated, and conviction is not essential”);
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(c) (2002) (making possession of marijuana a criminal
offense in South Carolina). 

AFFIRMED.      

GOOLSBY,  HOWARD, AND KITTREDGE,
JJ., concur.