Westbury v. Dorchester County

SCREENING MEMORANDUM

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Michael Westbury,       
Appellant,

v.

Dorchester County and Patrick Watts,       
Respondents.

Appeal From Dorchester County

Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-100

Submitted November 19, 2003 – Filed February 17, 2004

AFFIRMED

Michael Westbury, of St. George, for Appellant.

Marvin C. Jones and R. Clenten Campbell, of Walterboro, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Appellant sued Dorchester County
and the master in equity after the master vacated Appellant’s purchase of a
property at an auction conducted by the master. The trial judge granted summary
judgment to both defendants. We affirm.

FACTS

Dorchester County sold a property at an auction
on March 1, 1999. That auction was a mistake because Money First Financial Services,
one of the interested parties, had not been properly noticed about the auction. [1] Michael Westbury attended the auction and placed
the highest bid. Following the sale, the master in equity realized that the
auction had been an error, not only because Money First did not attend, but
also because a new Notice of Sale had not been issued. The master vacated the
sale and refunded Westbury his earnest money. When the property was properly
auctioned in July 1999, Westbury was present but did not place the highest bid;
therefore he did not obtain the property.

In February 2001, Westbury brought a “violation
of legal sale action” against Dorchester County and Patrick Watts, the master
who conducted the sale. Following a hearing where Westbury acted as his own
counsel, the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment to the county
and to the master. Westbury appeals.

ISSUES
[2] 

1) Did the trial court err in finding that the master
was entitled to judicial immunity?

(2) Did the trial court err in granting summary
judgment to the master?

ANALYSIS
[3] 

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is
no genuine issue of material fact and it is clear the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c), SCRCP. “In determining whether
any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 
Osborne ex rel. Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 7, 550 S.E.2d 319, 321
(2001). An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment under the same
standard applied by the trial court.  George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440,
451, 548 S.E.2d 868, 873 (2001).

The trial court ruled that the master was acting
within his official capacity and was therefore entitled to judicial immunity.
We agree. Judicial immunity is a longstanding legal principle. See McEachern
v. Black, 329 S.C. 642, 647, 496 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Judicial
immunity is one of the fundamental pillars upon which the modern system of justice
was built.”). That principle is statutory and is also recognized at common law.
Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 246, 553 S.E.2d 496, 506 (Ct. App.
2001). “Judicial immunity affords absolute immunity from suit. Therefore, a
finding of judicial immunity renders a complaint alleging judicial misconduct
meritless.” McEachern, 329 S.C. at 647, 496 S.E.2d at 661 (citation omitted). 
However, judicial immunity will not protect judicial officers if they act without
any jurisdiction, or if their act is not a judicial one, or if the suit is seeking
exclusively prospective, injunctive relief. Id. at 648, 496 S.E.2d at
662.

Here, the master was acting within his official
capacity when he mistakenly allowed the auction to proceed on the wrong date
and without proper notice. And he was acting within his official capacity when
he vacated the sale. Therefore, his actions were well within the limits of his
jurisdiction. Westbury seems to argue that the master should be liable because
the master made a mistake. But a master would be “absolutely immune from liability
for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority [was] flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. at 649, 496 S.E.2d at 663.
The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to the master.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1] The original date was March 1, but the master
had changed it to April 5.

[2] Westbury raises the following issues: “(1) Did
the trial judge err in finding [the master was] employed by Dorchester County?
(2) Did the trial judge err in finding that [the master was] paid by Dorchester
County tax dollars of $52,593? (3) Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.” Since Westbury
seeks a reversal of the summary judgment as “to the charge of appellant as
listed in [the] complaint,” we adopt Dorchester’s articulation of the issues.  

[3] The trial court granted summary judgment to both
the master and the county. In his brief, Westbury mentions that “Dorchester
County has an employee named Judge Patrick Watts,” (the master). But that
declaration is a mere statement of fact, not an argument. Since Westbury presented
no substantive argument against the judge’s ruling concerning Dorchester County,
he is considered to have waived that issue on appeal. See Gold Kist,
Inc. v. Citizens and S. Nat’l Bank of South Carolina, 286 S.C. 272, 275,
333 S.E.2d 67, 70 (Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that issues not argued in the appellant’s
brief are deemed abandoned on appeal). Therefore, we limit our analysis to
the summary judgment concerning the master.