Young v. Montessori Elementary School

PER CURIAM: Joy Young brought this action for breach of an employment contract
against St

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Joy Young,       
Appellant,

v.

Montessori Elementary School of St. Andrews, Inc.       
Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County

John L. Breeden, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-385

Heard April 10, 2003 – Filed June 5,
2003

AFFIRMED

Gerald F. Smith, of Columbia, for Appellant.

J. Charles Ormond, Jr. of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Joy Young brought this action
against Montessori Elementary School of St. Andrews, Inc. (Montessori) for breach
of an employment contract.  The trial court granted summary judgment to Montessori. 
We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Montessori extended an offer of employment
to Young, which is set forth in full below.

By this letter we invite you to join the Montessori Elementary
School of St. Andrews, Inc., initially on a part-time basis.  You will start
at an hourly salary of $10 to be paid biweekly.  Your hours, as of this writing,
will be from noon until 5:30 p.m. daily.  Your date to begin work is June 1. 
Additional benefits include:

(1)       paid tuition for the St. Nicholas/London
Centre primary teacher-training program, and, upon completion and agreement,
the elementary training;

(2)       tuition consideration for your two
children currently enrolled at the Montessori Early Learning Center;

(3)       the option to enroll in the school’s
group health insurance plan, with pretax payroll deduction of premiums from
your biweekly salary installment; and

(4)       paid vacation, including holidays (as
named in the parent handbook) and two weeks of vacation during the summer months,
beginning in the summer of 2000.

This offer of employment is contingent on:

(1)       your agreement to complete the training
program within 18 months and to remain as a full-time teacher at the school
for at least two years;

(2)       completion of a background check, including
State Law Enforcement Division fingerprinting, with results that satisfy us,
at our sole discretion, as to your fitness to work with children; and

(3)       your certification by the American
Red Cross for the practice of Standard First Aid and Adult CPR.

Please return an original signed copy of this letter to the
School’s address.  If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call
us. 

The next year, Montessori advised Young she was
required to enter into a new annual teacher employment contract and a “teacher
in training sponsorship” contract.  Young refused to accept the terms of the
new contracts, the parties were unable to reach a meeting of the minds, the
contracts were never signed, and Young was terminated. 

The court granted Montessori’s motion for summary
judgment, finding the contract was not for a definite term but rather created
an employment-at-will relationship. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well settled that summary judgment is appropriate only
where there is no genuine issue of material fact.  Rule 56, SCRCP.  The Court
must construe all ambiguities, conclusions, and interferences arising from the
evidence against the moving party; however, the opposing party may not rest
upon mere allegations or denials, but must respond with specific facts showing
a genuine issue. 

City of Columbia v. Town of Irmo, 316 S.C.
193, 195, 447 S.E.2d 855, 857 (1994); see also Rule 56, SCRCP. 

Where an action presents a question as to the construction
of a written contract and the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous,
the question is one of law.  When a court construes an employment contract,
as with any contract, resort is first made to the language of the contract in
issue, and if the language is perfectly plain and capable of legal construction,
it determines the rights and obligations of the parties. 

Holden v. Alice Mfg., Inc., 317 S.C. 215,
220, 452 S.E.2d 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Under the express terms of the contract, the two-year
period of the full-time teaching position would not begin until the eighteen
months of training were completed.  Young testified that she had stopped short
of completing the training.  Thus, by her failure to meet an express contingency
of the contract, the two-year term was never triggered.

South Carolina has long recognized the doctrine of employment
at-will.  Pursuant to this doctrine, “a contract for permanent employment, so
long as it is satisfactorily performed which is not supported by any consideration
other than the obligation or service to be performed on the one hand and the
wages to be paid on the other, is terminable at the pleasure of either party.”

Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop., Inc., 335
S.C. 330, 334, 516 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1999) (quoting Shealy v. Fowler,
182 S.C. 81, 87, 188 S.E. 499, 502 (1936)).  “An individual working for an employer
under a contract of employment for an indefinite period can be terminated at
will.”  Williams v. Riedman, 339 S.C. 251, 259, 529 S.E.2d 28, 32 (Ct.
App. 2000); see also Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp., 219 S.C. 272,
277, 64 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1951) (“‘Ordinarily, where there is no additional expression
as to duration, a contract for permanent employment implies an indefinite general
hiring, terminable at will.’”) (quoting Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 25
S.E.2d 436, 437 (N.C. 1943)).

In her deposition, Young testified she
clearly understood that, under the contract, she could quit or be terminated
at anytime within the 18 month training period without any obligation to repay
any monies spent on her behalf for training by Montessori. 

Q:  So you could leave after two and a half if you wanted
to?

A:  Or before two and a half.

Q: Or you could leave before, whenever you wanted to leave,
you could leave?

A:  Right, and there would not be a repayment.

“The subject matter and purposes of a contract
are to be considered in ascertaining the intention of the parties and the meaning
of the terms use[d].”  Holden, 317 S.C. at 221, 452 S.E.2d at 631.  “[I]n
determining the intent and purport of a contract, the court should not look
solely to one clause read in isolation from the rest of the document; rather,
it should consider the contents of the whole instrument[.]”  Id. (citation
omitted).

The overall structure of the contract
indicates Montessori was bound by one half and Young was bound by the other
half.  One part clearly sets out Young’s consideration and duties, and the other
clearly sets out Montessori’s consideration and duties.  We agree with the trial
court that the contract evinces no mutuality of the term of employment.  Young’s
own testimony and understanding buttresses this conclusion.

Young now urges an interpretation of the
contract that would require Montessori to employ her as long as she attended
the training school for which Montessori paid, regardless of her job performance,
while at the same time contending that she had the option of quitting at any
time without repaying the training costs.  Her prior testimony is contradictory
to her current position.  In the final analysis, the contract sets forth the
consideration provided by each party, but contains no definite term of employment. 
“In no one of these written instruments does there appear a definite date of
termination for appellant’s employment . . . .  Nor in Young’s testimony is
it established that the respondent guaranteed [her] a job for a fixed determinable
period of time.”  Young v. Indep. Publ’g Co., 273 S.C. 107, 111, 254
S.E.2d 681, 683 (1979).  The trial court properly found that both parties contemplated
this as at will employment. 

Because we agree
the contract admits to only one interpretation and creates no question of fact
for the jury, we find no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
and agree with its findings, which are well articulated in its order.

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL and HOWARD, JJ., and STROM, Acting Judge, concur.