Foster v. Foster

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Laura Brooks Foster,       
Appellant,

v.

William Heath Foster,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

Georgia V. Anderson, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-431

Heard April 8, 2003 – Filed June 24,
2003

AFFIRMED

Richard H. Rhodes, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

William Jeffrey McGurk, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Laura Brooks Foster (“Mother”)
appeals the family court’s order granting the parties joint custody of their
two minor children, with William Heath Foster (“Father”) acting as the primary
custodial parent.  She further asserts the family court erred in awarding Father
$7,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs.  We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and Father separated two years after the parties
married.  During the separation Mother engaged in an adulterous affair.  The
parties reconciled briefly, but permanently separated at Mother’s request. 
At the time of the separation, the parties had two minor children.  After permanently
separating from Father, Mother resumed her adulterous relationship.

Mother filed for divorce, seeking, among other things,
custody of the children.  Father counterclaimed, seeking a divorce on the ground
of adultery, child custody, and attorneys fees and costs.  The family court
temporarily granted the parties joint custody, with Mother acting as the primary
custodial parent.  Both parties were enjoined from exposing the children to
any paramours.  Six months later, the family court found Mother in willful contempt
of its temporary order for repeatedly exposing the children to her paramour.

At the final hearing, the parties admitted “reacting
physically” towards one another and being verbally abusive.  In addition, Mother
admitted continuing her adulterous relationship with her paramour throughout
the pendency of litigation.  Following the hearing, the family court awarded
Father a divorce on the ground of adultery.  The court further awarded the parties
joint custody of the children, with Father acting as the primary custodial parent. 
The court also awarded Father child support and attorneys fees of $7,000.00. 
Mother appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.       Child Custody

Mother argues the family court erred by not awarding
her custody of the children.  In the alternative, Mother argues the family court
erred by awarding the parties joint custody, with Father acting as the primary
custodial parent.  We disagree with both assertions.

“When reviewing the factual determinations of the
family court, an appellate court may take its own view of the preponderance
of the evidence.”  Scott v. Scott, Op. No. 25630 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed
Apr. 14, 2003) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 14 at 34, 39).  However, because the
family court sits in a better position to ascertain the witnesses’ demeanor
and veracity, this Court must afford its findings broad deference.  Id. 
Moreover, this Court “‘should be reluctant to substitute its own evaluation
of the evidence on child custody for that of the [family] court.’”  Id.
(quoting Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996))
(alteration in Scott).  Specifically in cases involving child custody,
the controlling factor is the child’s best interest.  Patel v. Patel,
347 S.C. 281, 285, 555 S.E.2d 386, 388 (2001).  In reviewing custody decisions,
we must view the evidence in light of “the totality of the circumstances peculiar
to each case.”  Paris v. Paris, 319 S.C. 308, 310, 460, S.E.2d 571, 572
(1995).  These peculiar circumstances “constitute[] the only scale upon which
the ultimate decision can be weighed.”  Id.

With respect to the issue of child custody, the family
court made several factual findings, including: 1) Wife openly defied a family
court order and was held in contempt; 2) Father and his family have developed
a close and loving relationship with the youngest child; 3) Father is better
able to handle the older child, while Mother complains the child is a “brat,
a handful, and out of control”; 4) Mother left children in daycare during months
in which she was not working and would not allow Father to take children out
of daycare on days when he was off from work; 5) Father got up at night with
the children, bathed them, put them to bed, washed their clothes, and cooked
for them; and 6) Father has the support of his extended family living in the
immediate area, while Mother does not.

Importantly the family court stated it was “concerned
about [Mother’s] acknowledged involvement with [her paramour] . . . because
of the negative impact that this may have on [the children’s] relationship with
[Father].”  The court continued, “[i]t also appears that [Mother] is emotionally
dependant on [her paramour].  She has placed her own interest and dependence
on [her paramour] before the best interests of her children.”  Moreover, Mother
repeatedly exposed the children to her paramour and his family, including overnight
trips, family gatherings, and allows the children to refer to her paramour as
“Daddy Scott” and her paramour’s mother as “Nana Linda.”

Notwithstanding these numerous findings, which
are supported by evidence in the record, Mother has invited “this [C]ourt to
exercise its equity powers” and reverse the family court’s order.  However,
we are “‘reluctant to substitute [our] own evaluation of the evidence . . .
for that of the [family] court’” with respect to the best interests of the parties’
minor children.  See Scott, Op. No. 25630 at 39 (quoting Woodall,
322 S.C. at 10, 471 S.E.2d at 157) (last alteration in Scott).  Moreover,
although we agree with the family court that neither party is a model parent,
having fully reviewed the record in light of “the totality of the circumstances
peculiar to [this] case,” we find the family court properly determined the issue
of custody.  See Paris, 319 S.C. at 310, 460, S.E.2d at 572.

II.      Attorneys Fees

Mother argues the family trial court erred by awarding
Father $7,000.00 in attorneys fees.  We deem this issue abandoned on appeal.

Mother’s brief fails to cite any authority regarding
the family court’s award of attorneys fees, or the appropriate standard this
Court should use in reviewing that award.  Thus, we deem this issue abandoned. 
See  First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d
513, 414 (1994) (holding where “[a]ppellant fails to provide . . . supporting
authority for his assertion” issue is deemed abandoned on appeal); Tirado
v. Tirado, 339 S.C. 649, 655, 530 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding
issues not supported by authority are deemed abandoned and will not be considered
on appeal).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the family court’s order
is

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL, HOWARD, JJ., and STROM, Acting Judge,
concur.