State v. Anstett

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Rodney Anstett,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County

William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-132

Submitted January 10, 2003 – Filed February
19, 2003

AFFIRMED

Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda Haile, of Columbia;
for Appellant.

Deputy Director for Legal Services
Teresa A. Knox, Legal Counsel Tommy Evans, Jr. and Legal Counsel J. Benjamin
Aplin, all of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rodney Anstett appeals from
an order of the trial court revoking his probation in full.  We affirm. 

FACTS

Anstett pled guilty to second degree burglary and
grand larceny less than $1000.  He received a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment,
suspended upon the service of five years probation, for burglary and a concurrent
sentence of five years imprisonment, suspended during probation, for grand larceny. 
Anstett did not appeal his convictions or sentences.

Less than three years after being released from
prison, Anstett was brought before the trial judge for a probation revocation
hearing.  Evidence was presented of:  at least two positive drug tests, failure
to complete a public service requirement assigned by his probation officer,
charge of driving under suspension, two charges of criminal domestic violence,
one charge of possession of marijuana, and one charge of possession of a loaded
shotgun.  The trial judge revoked Anstett’s probation in full. 

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction to
accept Anstett’s plea on the offense of second degree burglary?

II. Did the trial court err in revoking Anstett’s probation?

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.          Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Anstett argues the trial judge did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea to second degree burglary.  We
do not agree.

“A circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction
if:  (1) there has been an indictment which sufficiently states the offense;
(2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3) the charge is a lesser included
charge of the crime charged in the indictment.”  Locke v. State, 341
S.C. 54, 56, 533 S.E.2d 324, 325 (2000).  Questions regarding subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time.  Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355,
362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998).

“A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree
if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a
crime therein.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-312(A) (Supp. 2001). 

Anstett’s indictment for second degree
burglary read as follows:  “[t]hat Rodney Lee Anstett did in Aiken county on
or about July 21, 1994, willfully and unlawfully enter the dwelling of John
Farron Duncan without consent and with the intent to commit a crime therein.” 
The language of the indictment recites the required elements set forth in §
16-11-312(A).  Thus, the indictment in this case was sufficient, and Anstett
was fully informed of the charge against him.  See Browning v. State,
320 S.C. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1995) (finding the test of sufficiency
of indictment is whether it contains necessary elements of offense intended
to be charged and sufficiently apprises defendant of what he must be prepared
to defend).  Accordingly, the trial judge had proper subject matter jurisdiction
in this case.

II.          Probation Revocation

Anstett argues the trial judge erred in
revoking his probation because the decision was based in part on a finding that
he had violated a state law.  We do not agree.

Anstett contends the trial judge should
not have considered evidence of the charges committed in violation of probation
because he had not been found guilty of those offenses.  However, this argument
was not made at any point during the revocation hearing.  While Anstett’s counsel
stated she had “issue with a few of those” violations, this statement is insufficient
to preserve the issue for appellate review.  See State v. Hamilton,
333 S.C. 642, 648, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding a challenge to
the validity of the probation revocation hearing must be raised to and ruled
upon by the judge in order to be properly preserved).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the original trial judge
had subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case.  Further, the trial judge
in the probation revocation hearing did not err in revoking Anstett’s probation. 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.