Cynthia A. Bell v. Katy A. McLaughlin

Supreme Court

No. 2023-161-Appeal.
(NC 19-464)

Cynthia A. Bell :

v. :

Katy A. McLaughlin et al. :

ORDER

This case arises out of an arbitration hearing on claims for negligence brought

by the plaintiff, Cynthia A. Bell. The plaintiff now appeals from an order denying

her motion to vacate an arbitration award in the amount of $15,000 in her favor and

a separate order granting the motion of the defendants, Katy A. McLaughlin1 and

Daniel R. Pierce, to confirm the award. This Court directed the parties to appear and

show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided.

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and

that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons

set forth herein, we deny and dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal.

On November 27, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint in Newport County

Superior Court naming Katy A. McLaughlin, Daniel R. Pierce, John Griffin,

Bernadette M. Griffin, John Doe, and Jane Doe as defendants. The plaintiff alleged

1
The record is inconsistent as to the spelling of Katy A. McLaughlin’s last name.
We utilize the spelling that appears in the complaint. No disrespect is intended.
-1-
that, on January 10, 2017, a vehicle operated by McLaughlin and owned by Pierce

collided with a vehicle operated by Griffin, which in turn collided with plaintiff’s

vehicle. The plaintiff contended that, as a result of defendants’ negligence, she

sustained injuries, experienced and continued to experience pain and suffering,

incurred medical costs, and sustained a loss of wages and/or earning capacity. She

sought “any other damages recoverable under the full extent of the law.”

After the named defendants filed answers to plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff,

McLaughlin, and Pierce voluntarily entered into binding arbitration, pursuant to G.L.

1956 § 10-3-2.2 The arbitrator ultimately awarded plaintiff $15,000, plus interest.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in Newport

County Superior Court in the context of the litigation previously filed against all

defendants. She argued that the arbitrator had “exceeded his powers by taking

[j]udicial [n]otice that Dr. [John] Kripsak ‘did not have an accurate understanding

of the plaintiff’s prior medical history.’”

2
General Laws 1956 § 10-3-2 provides in relevant part:

“When clearly written and expressed, * * * an agreement
in writing between two (2) or more persons to submit to
arbitration any controversy existing between them at the
time of the agreement to submit shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract * * *.”
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In response, defendants McLaughlin and Pierce filed an objection to the

motion to vacate the arbitration award; they also filed a motion to confirm the

arbitration award. In their supporting memorandum, these defendants asserted that

the arbitrator “never took judicial notice” of the fact that “Dr. Kripsak did not have

an accurate understanding of the [p]laintiff’s prior medical history,” and merely

“relied on the evidence before him in rendering his award.” The defendants

McLaughlin and Pierce claimed that the arbitrator “simply did not find Dr. Kripsak’s

letter” persuasive, “for very good reasons which he clearly enumerate[d] in his

decision.”

A hearing on the motions was held on March 31, 2023, wherein the hearing

justice ultimately denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award and granted

defendants McLaughlin and Pierces’ motion to confirm the award.3 Orders granting

the motion to confirm the arbitration award and denying the motion to vacate the

arbitration award were entered on April 6, 2023. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal

that same day. No partial final judgment has been entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of

the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, nor have any of the parties moved for

entry of such judgment.

3
McLaughlin and Pierce had also moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which the hearing justice denied despite
noting that plaintiff’s argument for vacating the arbitration award “had no legs
whatsoever” and “really was a stretch.”
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After the prebriefing conference was held before a single justice of this Court,

an order entered, directing that, among other things:

“1. The case is remanded for the sole purpose of the
Superior Court considering a motion for entry of partial
final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The record shall remain
on remand for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days and
it shall be returned to this Court at the conclusion of such
period, or upon the Superior Court’s resolution of the
matter enumerated herein, whichever shall occur sooner.

“2. If the Superior Court denies the motion for entry of
partial final judgment, the appellant is directed to show
cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed
within twenty (20) days of the record being returned to this
Court.

“3. If the Superior Court grants the motion for entry of
partial final judgment, upon return to this Court, the case
is assigned to the show cause calendar. The parties are
directed to appear before this Court on a date to be selected
in order to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal
should not be decided without further briefing and
argument.” (Emphasis omitted.)

The case was returned to this Court following the remand, but no partial final

judgment was moved for, considered, or entered. A conditional order of dismissal

was then entered pursuant to Article I, Rule 18A of the Supreme Court Rules of

Appellate Procedure, which directed, in relevant part, that:

“[T]he above-referenced appeal is hereby dismissed for
failure to file a show cause statement as to why the appeal
should not be dismissed as provided in this Court’s order
dated 10/18/2023.

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“This Order will be vacated and the appeal reinstated if the
appellant’s supplemental statement is filed on or before
3/1/2024.”

The plaintiff filed a supplemental statement on February 28, 2024, asserting that the

hearing justice had “entered an order of final judgment with regards to Ms. Bell’s

claim against Ms. McLaughlin and Mr. Pierce on October 26, 2023,” but that it had

“[i]nadvertently * * * never been scanned into the portal.” An order was

subsequently entered by this Court stating:

“The [plaintiff] has filed a ‘Supplemental Statement’ with
this Court indicating that an order entering partial final
judgment was signed by a Superior Court justice but was
inadvertently not docketed. For that reason, this matter
shall be remanded to the Superior Court solely for the
purpose of the Superior Court entering the consent
judgment signed by a justice of that court on October 26,
2023 into the record. The Superior Court may not exceed
the scope of this remand order.” (Emphasis added.)

On remand, a “Consent Judgment” dated October 26, 2023, was then entered into

the record, and the case was returned to this Court.

Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in

relevant part, that:

“[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one (1) or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and direction, any
order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
-5-
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”
(Emphasis added.)

“This Court has clearly stated that ‘the purpose of Rule 54(b) is to avoid piecemeal

appeals.’” Mateo v. Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC, 310 A.3d

861, 865 (R.I. 2024) (brackets omitted) (quoting Astro-Med, Inc. v. R. Moroz, Ltd.,

811 A.2d 1154, 1156 (R.I. 2002)). “This policy ‘militates in favor of delaying

judgment until all claims involving all parties are ripe for disposition and entering

judgment as to all only when that time arrives.’” Id. (quoting Astro-Med, Inc., 811

A.2d at 1156).

In the case at bar, the arbitration and resulting award involved only two of the

several named defendants, and yet no partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)

was ever entered. See Napier v. Epoch Corporation, 971 A.2d 594, 598 (R.I. 2009)

(“When fewer than all of the claims in a case have been adjudicated, the trial court

may direct the entry of final judgment as to those claims, but only upon an express

determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for

the entry of judgment.” (brackets omitted and emphasis added) (quoting Small

Business Loan Fund Corp. v. Loft, 734 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1998))). Furthermore,

plaintiff did not follow this Court’s directive to remand the case “for the sole purpose

of the Superior Court considering a motion for entry of partial final judgment
-6-
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.” Indeed, the

“Consent Judgment” does not comport with the standard set forth in Rule 54(b) and

by this Court. See Mateo, 310 A.3d at 865. The plaintiff did not move for partial

final judgment nor did the hearing justice consider such a motion. Simply put, the

hearing justice did not provide the necessary “express determination that there is no

just reason for delay” of the entry of partial final judgment or “an express direction

for the entry of judgment.” Super. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Without a partial final judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b), the issues

raised in the plaintiff’s appeal are not properly before us.

Accordingly, we deny and dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal. The record shall be

returned to the Superior Court.

Entered as an Order of this Court this day of June, 2024.

By Order,

____________________________
Clerk

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

ORDER COVER SHEET

Title of Case Cynthia A. Bell v. Katy A. McLaughlin et al.

No. 2023-161-Appeal.
Case Number
(NC 19-464)

Date Order Filed June 21, 2024

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Source of Appeal Newport County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough

For Plaintiff:

Ronald J. Resmini, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants:

Brian T. Dougan, Esq.

SU-CMS-02B (revised November 2022)