State v. Trequan Baker

Supreme Court

No. 2024-280-C.A.
(P1/22-1236AG)

State :

v. :

Trequan Baker. :

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Supreme Court

No. 2024-280-C.A.
(P1/22-1236AG)

State :

v. :

Trequan Baker. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. Everyone agrees that during

cross-examination of the defendant, Trequan Baker (defendant or Baker),1 the

prosecutor twice impermissibly inquired about his post-arrest decision to remain

silent while in custody at the Pawtucket Police Department. Further, the offending

questions posed by the prosecutor endeavored to undermine the defendant’s

credibility by suggesting that his testimony—that he acted in the defense of others—

had been recently manufactured as evidenced by his previous silence. The trial

justice immediately sustained the objections and, after several more questions

followed by a conference at the sidebar, issued a cautionary instruction that the

1
We are advised that the defendant’s legal first name is Tre’Quan Baker.
Nonetheless, we adopt the spelling used in the charging document. We intend no
disrespect.
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defendant had the right to remain silent and that the jury may not draw an adverse

inference from the exercise of that constitutional right. The question we confront is

whether this limiting instruction was sufficient to cure the ensuing prejudice or

whether the trial justice erred when she denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

Despite a careful and valiant effort by the trial justice, we discern error and vacate

the defendant’s conviction.

Factual Background

In the early morning hours of January 24, 2022, defendant fatally shot Qudus

Kafo (Kafo) and seriously injured Bruno Vaz (Vaz). At trial, Baker did not contest

the underlying facts that he was responsible for the shooting but rather insisted that

his actions were justified because he acted in the defense of others, viz., his cousins.

Because the defense of others doctrine focuses upon a defendant’s “own reasonable

perceptions as he or she comes to the aid of the apparent victim,” unless stated

otherwise, we recite the relevant facts from Baker’s perspective. See State v. Beeley,

653 A.2d 722, 727 (R.I. 1995). We do so briefly, recognizing that the underlying

facts are not particularly germane to the legal issue raised in this appeal.

A

The Shooting and Its Aftermath

On the evening of January 23, 2022, defendant was at home with a friend,

Verrie Rose (Rose), when he received an unexpected telephone call from Derrick

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Baker (Derrick), a cousin.2 The conversation was terse: Derrick and another cousin,

Koree Baker (Koree), were at a club known as the FabCity Cigar Lounge (FabCity)

in Pawtucket, Rhode Island; there had been an altercation; and Derrick feared further

trouble. Baker perceived Derrick’s voice as sounding shaky and scared; thus, when

the conversation ended, he promptly decided “[t]o go to FabCity [with Rose] and

just check on everybody, make sure they [were] okay.” The defendant grabbed a

Glock 22—a firearm he readily admitted was unlicensed—and stashed the weapon

in his waistband. As Baker explained at trial, he did so because FabCity was known

as an establishment with a propensity for violence, and he “wanted to have [the

firearm] just in case.”

Around midnight, Baker and Rose arrived at FabCity, a club renowned for

searching its patrons for weapons before allowing entry. After a pat-down frisk

discovered nothing amiss, Baker entered the club; importantly, however, Rose and

the firearm remained in the vehicle, parked nearby. Once inside, Derrick directed

his cousin’s attention to Kafo, the person with whom he had the earlier altercation.

Baker’s testimony detailed multiple interactions and observations involving

Kafo and his associates on this early morning. For our purposes, however, it suffices

to summarize defendant’s testimony as reflecting Kafo’s continuous aggressive and

2
Derrick Baker and his cousins share a common surname; accordingly, we refer to
the cousins by first name. We intend no disrespect.
-3-
somewhat violent behavior toward himself (defendant), his family members, and

others. The defendant also conveyed numerous instances involving Kafo (or his

companions), which he interpreted as threats of violence. Contrastingly, defendant

testified concerning his various efforts to deescalate the sometimes-volatile

situations.

After less than an hour inside the club, Baker noticed a member of Kafo’s

crew depart the establishment. Aware that certain family members were already

outside the venue—and recalling the prior threats of violence and his belief that Kafo

and/or his compadres could be armed—defendant feared that trouble might be

imminent. Baker exited FabCity, retrieved the Glock 22, and secreted the weapon

in his waistband. After several minutes milling outside, Baker and others were on

the verge of peacefully departing. A video recording captured the ensuing moments.

At 12:46:48 a.m., Kafo assaulted Derrick, and one second later, Derrick

retaliated and swung at Kafo. Three seconds later, another Kafo colleague, Vaz,

entered the fray, causing Derrick to tumble, face-first, into the ground. As Baker

watched, Vaz and Kafo hovered over Derrick, punching and kicking him in the head.

Others immediately joined the fracas. Two seconds later, fearing for Derrick’s life,

Baker shot Vaz, seriously injuring him. Seconds later, defendant testified, he

witnessed Kafo lunging at a family member and motioning toward his waist.

Believing that Kafo was about to shoot Derrick or Koree, Baker testified that “out

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of instinct I just fired the second shot.” The bullet struck Kafo, inflicting a mortal

wound. The only weapon used, seen, or discovered during the melee was in

defendant’s possession, the Glock 22.

Notwithstanding Baker’s testimony about what he had seen, he also

acknowledged that the video recording contradicted his perspective at significant

points. For example, despite testifying that Kafo and Vaz were kicking Derrick

while he lay helpless on the ground, during trial defendant admitted that the

recording did not support his prior testimony.

The defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder (count 1),

discharging a firearm while in the commission of a crime of violence resulting in

death (count 2), possession of a firearm without a license (count 5), and conspiracy

to commit an unlawful act, viz., possession of a firearm without a license (count 6).

The defendant was found not guilty of assaulting Vaz with a dangerous weapon

resulting in serious bodily injury and discharging a firearm while in the commission

of a crime of violence resulting in permanent incapacity (counts 3 and 4).

Effectively, the jury determined that when Baker shot Vaz, he acted in the defense

of others, but when he shot Kafo, he was not acting in the defense of others. The

trial justice sentenced defendant to serve sixty years’ imprisonment (count 1) and a

consecutive sentence of life imprisonment (count 2). Baker was also sentenced to

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ten years’ imprisonment (counts 5 and 6), to be served concurrently to the sentence

imposed on count 1. This appeal ensued.

B

The Impermissible Questions

On the seventh day of trial, defendant testified as the final witness. As

cross-examination was winding down, the prosecutor focused on defendant’s

January 26, 2022 post-arrest interactions with officers from the Pawtucket Police

Department:

“Q Mr. Baker, you were arrested on January 26th of
2022, correct?

“A Yes.

“Q And you were brought to the Pawtucket Police
Station, and when you’re in the cellblock you
initially indicate to them that you would like to
speak to detectives. Do you recall that?

“A No, I never said that.

“Q Do you recall being brought to an interview room?

“A Yes.

“Q And in the interview room, Pawtucket police
provided you with a sandwich and with some water?
Do you remember?

“A Yes.

“Q And they also provided you with the ability to make
a confidential phone call to an attorney, correct?
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“A After I asked them, yes.

“Q Yes. And so you asked them if you could make a
phone call, they allowed you to make the phone call,
and then they advised you of your constitutional
rights?

“A Correct.

“Q Including your right to remain silent. And after that
phone call, you elected, as is your right to do so, to
remain silent, correct?

“A Correct.

“Q Fair to say that in that interaction at Pawtucket
Police on January 26, you never mentioned
anything to them about defending others?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

“THE COURT: Sustained.

“Q In terms of what you told us this morning in this
morning’s session about defending others, you
hadn’t mentioned that previously to any members of
law enforcement.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

“THE COURT: Sustained.”

After a colloquy of six additional questions, none of which drew an objection,

defense counsel requested a sidebar, addressed the improper questions, and agreed

to a cautionary instruction. The trial justice stated:

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“Ladies and gentlemen, to the extent that this witness was
asked questions regarding whether he had provided certain
information or failed to provide certain information to law
enforcement at any point in time prior to his taking the
stand here, I will remind you that as set forth in the
preliminary instructions last week that the defendant at all
times has had and continues to have the right to remain
silent, and that his decision or determination not to offer
any information or speak to law enforcement at any point
in time is consistent with his exercise of that right to
remain silent. And from the question asked that was
sustained, you cannot in any way draw any unfavorable
inference or adverse inference from this defendant’s
decision not to provide such information to law
enforcement.”

Defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the limiting instruction but did not

foreclose the possibility that after conducting legal research, he might move for a

mistrial.

Shortly thereafter, defendant’s testimony concluded, and, as he forewarned

the trial justice, defense counsel moved to pass the case. The next day, the trial

justice denied the motion. In so doing, the trial justice recognized that the jurors

were instructed on multiple occasions that defendant has a constitutional right to

remain silent, viz., in a jury questionnaire, on the first day of jury selection, during

voir dire, and in the cautionary instruction. The trial justice also foreshadowed that

the final charge would again instruct the jury on the constitutional principle that a

defendant has the right to remain silent. The trial justice articulated specific

findings:

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“In the context of this case this is not such an explosive
question that was being asked that is not able to be
addressed through the course of a cautionary instruction.
Indeed, this [c]ourt finds that the cautionary instruction
provided already was enough to cure any prejudice, and
the nature of that question and the cautionary instruction
do not warrant the need for individual voir dire of the
jurors, and in any event, they will again be instructed on
these very same principles.

“This [c]ourt is satisfied in the total context of this case
that such a limiting instruction, the final instructions, both
of which build upon the preliminary instructions given at
the start of jury selection cures any prejudice to the
defendant in challenging his silence at the time of his
arrest.”

Subsequently, the trial justice charged the jury, and again indicated:

“To the extent that questions were asked but not permitted
to be answered regarding what the defendant did or did not
say to law enforcement at any point in time after his arrest
and up until this trial, you are further instructed that the
defendant had the right to decline to speak to law
enforcement, and no adverse inference can be drawn by
the defendant’s election to exercise his constitutional right
to remain silent, which is a right that we all have.

“The defendant’s credibility should be determined based
upon what he testified to here in the courtroom, and you
should not consider the defendant’s election to exercise his
right to remain silent at an earlier time in assessing his
credibility.”

Defense counsel expressed no objection to any portion of the final charge but

cautioned that the absence of an objection should not be interpreted as “conceding

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the adequacy of the instruction [the trial justice] gave in an effort to cure the

comment from [the prosecutor] that came up yesterday.”

Standard of Review

“It is well settled that, when called upon to review a trial justice’s ruling on a

motion for a mistrial, this Court affords the decision great weight and will disturb

the decision only if it was clearly wrong.” State v. Barboza, 262 A.3d 684, 689 (R.I.

2021). As we have noted, “the trial justice has a front row seat during the trial so

that the trial justice can best evaluate the effects of any prejudice on the jury.” Id.

(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 1007 (R.I. 2008)).

“As such, in ruling on a motion for a mistrial, ‘the trial justice must determine

whether the evidence would cause the jurors to be so inflamed as to make them

unable to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented.’” Id. (quoting State

v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 332 (R.I. 2011)).

Discussion

On appeal, defendant raises a single issue and contends that despite the

curative instructions, the trial justice erred when she declined to grant a mistrial

based upon the prosecutor’s impermissible post-arrest inquiry. The error was

particularly prejudicial, defendant asserts, because the prosecutor’s questions

occurred during the cross-examination of defendant and were aimed at undermining

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his credibility before the jury by suggesting that defendant’s assertion of the defense

of others to justify his actions was contrived after the shooting. We agree.

It is beyond peradventure that “[t]he use of a defendant’s post-Miranda

admonition that he will remain silent for impeachment purposes violates the

due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” State v. Goddard, 799 A.2d 263,

266 (R.I. 2002) (brackets omitted). A half-century ago, the Supreme Court of the

United States explicated:

“When a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda
requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he says
may be used against him, and that he may have an attorney
if he wishes * * * it does not comport with due process to
permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to
his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because
he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as
he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might
be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony.” Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring)).

Thus, Doyle unmistakably held that the use of a defendant’s “silence, at the time of

arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474

U.S. 284, 291 (1986) (“Doyle rests on ‘the fundamental unfairness of implicitly

assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his

silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.’”) (quoting South

Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983)).
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Critically, before this Court, the state does not suggest that the prosecutor’s

questions were permissible. The defendant points to our decision in State v.

Sherman, 113 R.I. 77, 317 A.2d 445 (1974), and claims his situation is “strikingly

similar.” In our opinion, Sherman provides important guideposts but is not

dispositive.

In Sherman, the prosecutor’s closing argument contained the following

remark: “Might I point out, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the actual fact of the assault

has never been denied.” Sherman, 113 R.I. at 79, 317 A.2d at 447 (deletion omitted).

The defendant’s immediate objection was overruled, but when the summation

concluded, the trial justice offered a cautionary instruction. Id. The next day, the

trial justice charged the jury and reiterated the defendant’s constitutional right to

remain silent. Id. at 80, 317 A.2d at 447.

This Court vacated the conviction. See Sherman, 113 R.I. at 84, 317 A.2d at

449. We concluded that neither the cautionary instruction nor the final charge

remedied the prejudice that was placed before the jury. See id. at 82-83, 317 A.2d at

448-49. In so doing, we explained:

“If such error is to be cured, it is essential that a cautionary
instruction be given immediately in order that the seed
planted by the remark will not be given time to germinate.
In addition to immediacy, adequacy is required. The
cautionary instruction must be such that the jury is
informed in language understandable by the ordinary,
reasonable man that the defendant has a constitutional

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right to be free from compulsion of any kind, physical or
mental, to testify in his own defense.

“* * * The cautionary instruction will be lacking in the
required adequacy to accomplish such result unless it
clearly informs the jury that they may not draw any
inference or reach any presumption concerning the guilt of
the defendant because he did not testify in his own
defense. The mere reference to the defendant’s
constitutional right not to testify is not enough. In our
opinion, to be adequate, a cautionary instruction must
clearly disclose the thrust of the obligation of the jury to
refrain from drawing any inference from such a failure to
testify, and impress upon them that, should they do so,
they would, in effect, deprive the defendant of his
constitutional right to a fair trial and violate their oath as
jurors.” Id. at 81-82, 317 A.2d at 448.

Although we suggested in Sherman that the initial cautionary instruction may

have been timely—it was rendered at the close of the prosecutor’s summation—we

nonetheless determined that it was inadequate because it failed “to disclose to the

jury the compulsory nature of its obligation to refrain from drawing any inference

from defendant’s failure to testify.” Sherman, 113 R.I. at 82, 317 A.2d at 448.

Relatedly, this Court determined that even if the final charge satisfied the adequacy

requirement, the instruction lacked “immediacy.” Id. at 83, 317 A.2d at 449; see also

id. at 82, 317 A.2d at 448 (“We think that the ultimate requirement in a cautionary

instruction, to make it effective, is that it be adequate to clearly impress upon the

minds of the jurors that they are precluded by their oath from drawing from a failure

to testify any inference tending to establish the guilt of the defendant.”).

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In our opinion, Sherman does not control our analysis because, unlike the case

at bar, Sherman did not concern a prejudicial comment made when the defendant

was testifying on his own behalf at his trial. We contrast Sherman with State v.

Smith, 446 A.2d 1035 (R.I. 1982), in which the prosecutor cross-examined the

defendant concerning his post-arrest failure “to tell the police the story that he had

told at trial * * *.” Smith, 446 A.2d at 1036. We held that the trial justice improperly

permitted cross-examination concerning the defendant’s silence, that the error was

not harmless, and that the impermissible inquiry violated the defendant’s

due-process rights. Id. Our framing of the issue in Smith applies equally in the

present context:

“The crucial issue * * * was one of credibility. The line
of questioning which was improperly allowed bore
directly on the credibility of the defendant’s testimony.
We cannot say, therefore, that * * * the error did not
contribute to the guilty verdict.” Id.

Thus, in Smith, we vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

Id.

To be sure, unlike Smith, the trial justice immediately sustained the objections,

and, therefore, defendant’s answers were never heard by the jury. However,

“[s]ilence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings may be
nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda
rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly
ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise
the person arrested. * * * Moreover, while it is true that
the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that
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silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to
any person who receives the warnings. In such
circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently
offered at trial.” Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18.

Our conclusion that the offending cross-examination questions were

inherently prejudicial and violated defendant’s right to due process is buttressed by

several factors. During the sidebar, the prosecutor’s own explanatory statement

revealed the aim: “I was just trying to elicit that we haven’t heard [about the defense

of others theory] before.” This explanation strikes at the heart of a defendant’s right

to remain silent. Additionally, after the trial justice sustained the first objection, the

prosecutor remarkably responded with a second question that was substantively

identical to the previous objectionable question. As counsel has impressed upon this

Court, in light of Baker’s decision to testify, the jury was never aware that defendant

had invoked his right to remain silent until the prosecutor’s improper questions.

Finally, the offending questions occurred in the context of an indictment brought by

the state against defendant alleging serious offenses carrying the possibility of

multiple life sentences upon conviction. Having made the decision to testify in his

own defense and place his credibility before the jury in this, defendant’s trial, Baker

was entitled to take the witness stand with the expectation that the state would not

violate his constitutional rights. We hasten to add one final caveat; our conclusion

should not be construed to suggest that a violation of a defendant’s constitutional
- 15 -
rights constitutes per se reversible error. Nothing in this opinion departs from our

harmless error precedent, which the state, understandably, did not raise.

In no way do we insinuate criticism of the trial justice’s efforts. We fully

appreciate the complexity of this unexpected eleventh-hour occurrence, as well as

the trial justice’s efforts to salvage a trial that was in its seventh day and on the

precipice of conclusion. The trial justice’s endeavors notwithstanding, we conclude

that the offending questions could not be cured through a limiting instruction and a

mistrial was warranted. See State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 828 (R.I. 1992); Smith,

446 A.2d at 1036.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of conviction. The papers in

this case are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Trequan Baker.

No. 2024-280-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/22-1236AG)

Date Opinion Filed March 24, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kristin E. Rodgers

For State:

Christopher R. Bush
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Angela M. Yingling
Rhode Island Public Defender