E.H. Turf Supply Co., Inc. d/b/a Allen's Seed v. Roger Tavares

Supreme Court

No. 2024-314-Appeal.
(WD 24-282)

E.H. Turf Supply Co., Inc. d/b/a Allen’s :
Seed

v. :

Roger Tavares. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2024-314-Appeal.
(WD 24-282)

E.H. Turf Supply Co., Inc. d/b/a Allen’s :
Seed

v. :

Roger Tavares. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. Rogerio1 Tavares (defendant or Mr. Tavares)

appeals from a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of E.H. Turf Supply

Company, Inc. d/b/a Allen’s Seed (plaintiff or E.H. Turf Supply) in the amount of

$1,703.71. E.H. Turf Supply alleged, initially in District Court, that Mr. Tavares

stopped payment on a check he tendered for services that E.H. Turf Supply

performed to fix Mr. Tavares’s tractor; Mr. Tavares appealed the District Court’s

judgment to the Superior Court. Before this Court, Mr. Tavares alleges that the

Superior Court erred in (1) allowing E.H. Turf Supply to present its case first; (2)

1
Since its inception, the caption of this case has identified Mr. Tavares as “Roger”
rather than “Rogerio,” his preferred name. Out of respect for Mr. Tavares, this Court
will use his preferred name.
-1-
ruling that certain evidence that Mr. Tavares sought to introduce was inadmissible;

and (3) failing to consider his status as a self-represented litigant during the trial.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the

parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be

summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and

reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may

decide this case without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in

this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

This is the second small-claims action filed in District Court by E.H. Turf

Supply against Mr. Tavares. In its first complaint, filed in February 2022 (2022

complaint), E.H. Turf Supply alleged that Mr. Tavares had stopped payment on a

check tendered to E.H. Turf Supply for maintenance performed on Mr. Tavares’s

tractor; the initial complaint sought payment in the amount of $1,703. Mr. Tavares

returned the summons generated in that action without signing it, and the suit was

later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

In January 2024, E.H. Turf Supply filed the instant action in District Court

again seeking payment for services (2024 complaint). Mr. Tavares filed an answer

in which he denied the allegations in the complaint and argued that plaintiff’s

counsel had been a “no-show” on the date of trial on the 2022 complaint and that,

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therefore, E.H. Turf Supply’s choice to refile its complaint demonstrated “bad faith”

and a violation of the rules of professional conduct. Mr. Tavares also asserted a

counterclaim “for services not rendered” and sought $2,500 in compensatory

damages. The form on which Mr. Tavares asserted his counterclaim stated that,

“[b]y filing this counterclaim, I waive my right to appeal on the counterclaim only.”

The document further stated, in all-capital letters above the signature line, “THE

DEFENDANT WAIVES RIGHT TO APPEAL ON COUNTER CLAIM ONLY.”

The District Court held a bench trial on May 20, 2024. At the conclusion of

the trial, judgment entered in favor of plaintiff with an award of damages in the

amount of $1,500 plus costs. Mr. Tavares filed a notice of appeal on the same day

that judgment entered.

On May 30, 2024, the Superior Court issued a notice scheduling trial for

June 21, 2024; and Mr. Tavares filed a statement of the case arguing that the District

Court had “denied [him], the defendant, and a pro se litigant, the fair opportunity to

present [his] case and evidence.” Mr. Tavares argued (1) that the voluntary dismissal

of the 2022 complaint was never properly served on him; and (2) that the District

Court judge erred by accepting plaintiff’s 2024 complaint without following

“specific procedural rules to prevent abuse of the legal process,” by allowing

plaintiff to file its 2024 complaint which, he alleged, had been refiled as “a strategic

move to gain an unfair advantage in the litigation process,” and which the District

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Court had accepted “without proper scrutiny,” and by denying him the right to

introduce evidence at trial. Mr. Tavares also argued that the District Court was

biased in favor of plaintiff, erred by relying on the facts contained in plaintiff’s

witness’s testimony rather than his own, and by misinterpreting the evidence, which,

he urged, was inadequate to establish liability.

A one-day bench trial commenced on July 26, 2024. See G.L. 1956 § 9-12-

10. E.H. Turf Supply, as the plaintiff who filed the underlying 2024 complaint,

presented the testimony of Erik Hagenstein (Mr. Hagenstein), the president and

owner of E.H. Turf Supply, first. Mr. Tavares objected to Mr. Hagenstein being

called as a witness on the grounds that he had not received “prior notice or disclosure

of the witness, [he was] prejudice[d] due to nondisclosure” and that Mr.

Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant; the court overruled his objection.

Mr. Hagenstein testified regarding E.H. Turf Supply’s procedure to diagnose

and fix broken equipment. He testified that in a job like the one Mr. Tavares

requested,

“we would go through what’s to be done, performed, what
parts may be involved, provide an estimate. If we’re given
an approval, we go ahead and perform that work, and
when the customer comes in, we basically start the
machine, operate it, show them what we did, explain it,
and * * * if everybody’s in agreement * * * they pay for
the work done and take the unit.”

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Mr. Hagenstein testified that he was not directly involved with Mr. Tavares’s tractor,

but Mr. Hagenstein was nonetheless able to identify the estimate that E.H. Turf

Supply provided to Mr. Tavares. Mr. Hagenstein further testified that Mr. Tavares’s

signature was on the bottom of the estimate, that the estimate was converted into an

invoice when “everybody’s in agreement” and “the work [was] performed,” and that

the services provided for in the estimate were performed at the cost provided in the

estimate.

Additionally, Mr. Hagenstein testified that E.H. Turf Supply received a

personal check from Mr. Tavares for the full amount owed on the date of completion

of its work, a copy of which was entered into evidence without objection. E.H. Turf

Supply then released the tractor to Mr. Tavares. After receiving the check, E.H. Turf

Supply’s bank informed plaintiff that there was a stop-payment placed on the check

by Mr. Tavares. Mr. Hagenstein testified that E.H. Turf Supply then attempted to

reach out to Mr. Tavares, including by certified letter, 2 without receiving a response,

and then called the state police. Mr. Hagenstein testified that, at the time of trial,

E.H. Turf Supply had not received payment for its services.

Mr. Tavares conducted extensive cross-examination of Mr. Hagenstein,

questioning whether his company was certified to work on John Deere tractors,

2
Mr. Tavares objected to introduction of a copy of the certified letter as a full exhibit.
The trial justice noted his objection but overruled it, concluding that “plaintiff ha[d]
met its burden of proof by making appropriate foundation.”
-5-
whether E.H. Turf Supply had contacted John Deere to “assist” with the repair of the

tractor, whether Mr. Hagenstein was familiar with the type of tractor Mr. Tavares

brought in, and whether Mr. Hagenstein was confident in the accuracy and

completeness of the work performed by his employees. Mr. Tavares further inquired

into damage to the hood of his tractor, which he alleged was caused by E.H. Turf

Supply employees, and, with the assistance of the trial justice, introduced a police

report detailing that damage. However, Mr. Tavares did not ask Mr. Hagenstein any

questions about the police report.

Mr. Tavares also questioned Mr. Hagenstein about the work listed in the

estimate. Mr. Hagenstein testified that he did not recall why Mr. Tavares had

brought in his tractor. Mr. Tavares then asked whether the problems listed on the

estimate could indicate “an issue with stalling on a tractor” to which Mr. Hagenstein

responded, “I guess if it’s not charging, yes, I could see that stalling.”

On redirect examination, counsel for E.H. Turf Supply asked Mr. Hagenstein

to confirm that the estimate contained a statement at the end that read: “talked to

Roger, all set” and that Mr. Tavares had signed the estimate. Mr. Hagenstein

confirmed that that notation indicated to him “[t]hat [E.H. Turf Supply] went over

what * * * work was performed, * * * any issues he may have had, they were

addressed, and * * * it’s all set.”

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After redirect examination, and while Mr. Hagenstein was still on the stand,

Mr. Tavares sought to introduce invoices from three businesses other than E.H. Turf

Supply. The first was an invoice from a John Deere dealer in Massachusetts. The

plaintiff objected. Mr. Tavares explained that he sought to introduce the exhibit to

show that “the belts that [E.H. Turf Supply] said they * * * replaced * * * [still]

needed to be replaced” after the tractor was picked up, corroborating his defense that

there were still issues with his tractor after plaintiff’s service. The trial justice

sustained plaintiff’s objection on the grounds that the invoice constituted hearsay,

marked the invoice for identification only, and instructed Mr. Tavares that he was

permitted to testify about the steps he took after picking up the tractor from E.H.

Turf Supply.

Next, Mr. Tavares sought to introduce a second invoice for items he had

purchased before he brought his tractor to E.H. Turf Supply. That invoice, which

was admitted as a full exhibit, showed that he had purchased hydraulic fluid on

November 17, 2020.

Finally, Mr. Tavares sought to introduce a third invoice from another repair

shop. The plaintiff restated its objection to that exhibit, and the exhibit was marked

for identification. Mr. Tavares then showed Mr. Hagenstein the third invoice and

asked why a subsequent repair shop would have flushed hydraulic fluid from the

tractor “within a short time frame” after E.H. Turf Supply said it did the same thing.

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Mr. Hagenstein explained that the other shop’s invoice reflected that “a transmission

* * * was swapped from another model” and the fluid listed on their invoice was

“new transmission fluid.”

Before the close of testimony, the trial justice asked Mr. Tavares whether he

had “anything [he] want[ed] to tell me that [he] ha[dn’t] already told me?” Mr.

Tavares testified that Mr. Hagenstein was not credible “given his limited experience

with the John Deere tractor 332 model and the lack of evidence supporting his shop’s

certification to work on John Deere diesel engines.” Mr. Tavares also stated that

Mr. Hagenstein’s “failure to adequately communicate” with him about the parts

needed to fix his tractor and the fact that E.H. Turf Supply had to consult a John

Deere dealer during their repairs “raises concerns about the thoroughness and the

reliability of the repairs performed.” Mr. Tavares also took issue with the fact that

Mr. Hagenstein was “not the mechanic” and that his testimony differed from the

bookkeeper who testified for E.H. Turf Supply in District Court. Mr. Tavares

asserted that these factors “collectively diminish[ed] the truthfulness, the

trustworthiness of [Mr. Hagenstein’s] testimony * * *.”

The trial justice subsequently issued her decision from the bench. The court

summarized the procedural history of the case and detailed the testimony heard at

the trial. She noted that Mr. Hagenstein testified that the services outlined in the

estimate, which was converted into an invoice, had been performed; that the cost of

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the services was accurate; and that Mr. Tavares made a payment for the services

reflected in the estimate, a copy of which he received at the time he picked up the

tractor. The trial justice found that defendant owed $ 1,703.71. The trial justice also

found that it was undisputed that Mr. Tavares paid that amount and that he then

stopped payment on his check. The trial justice acknowledged that defendant “did

testify, without objection, that he did not believe the work was performed,” but that

there was no admissible evidence to substantiate that belief “because the [c]ourt has

not allowed the introduction of full exhibits * * * [from] subsequent companies that

have looked at the tractor.” The trial justice therefore found that E.H. Turf Supply

was entitled to judgment in the amount of $1,703.71.

The Superior Court entered judgment on August 29, 2024. Mr. Tavares filed

his notice of appeal to this Court on September 3, 2024.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews “the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury”

deferentially. Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 68 A.3d 425, 433 (R.I. 2013) (quoting

Pelletier v. Laureanno, 46 A.3d 28, 35 (R.I. 2012)). As a result “we will not disturb

the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury unless such findings are clearly

erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence

or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.” Id. at

433-34 (quoting Grady v. Narragansett Electric Company, 962 A.2d 34, 41 (R.I.

-9-
2009)). However, “we review de novo the trial justice’s conclusions of law.” Id. at

434.

Analysis

On appeal, Mr. Tavares argues, first, that the trial justice erred in denying him

the right to obtain discovery about plaintiff’s witness, Mr. Hagenstein, and that Mr.

Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant. Second, he contends that the trial justice

erred when she allowed plaintiff to present its argument first, relied on testimony

from witnesses who were not well informed on the complexities of the repair of his

tractor in reaching her conclusion, and excluded evidence of repairs from other

dealers, all of which amounted to structural error. And, third, Mr. Tavares argues

that the trial justice erred in failing to consider his status as a self-represented

litigant.3

A. Mr. Hagenstein’s Testimony

The defendant first contends that the trial justice erred in denying him the

opportunity to obtain discovery with regard to Mr. Hagenstein’s trial testimony and

certain exhibits presented at trial. He further contends that Mr. Hagenstein was a

surprise witness, and that Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant. Mr. Tavares

3
Mr. Tavares makes certain arguments in his statement filed pursuant to Article I,
Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding the conduct
of the trial in the District Court. However, because this appeal arises from a de novo
trial before, and entry of judgment by, the Superior Court, we confine our review to
that proceeding and judgment.
- 10 -
objected to Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony at trial, and the trial justice overruled his

objection.

The defendant’s arguments are without merit. First, Mr. Tavares’s allegation

that the trial justice erred in denying him discovery with regard to Mr. Hagenstein’s

testimony and plaintiff’s exhibits is without merit because Mr. Tavares was not

entitled to discovery in Superior Court on appeal from the District Court. Rule 81(b)

of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states that, on appeal from the District

Court, “[t]he provisions of Rules 26 through 37, relative to discovery, shall not be

applicable” unless a party makes a showing that lack of discovery will result in

injustice or undue hardship. Therefore, Mr. Tavares was not entitled to discovery of

plaintiff’s witnesses or evidence, and there is no indication that Mr. Tavares ever

argued that the lack of discovery would result in injustice or undue hardship. As a

result, he was not entitled to pretrial discovery of Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony. For

this reason, there is similarly no merit to Mr. Tavares’s assertion that Mr. Hagenstein

was a surprise witness or that he suffered trial by ambush.

Second, Mr. Tavares argues that the testimony Mr. Hagenstein provided was

irrelevant because he did not possess specific knowledge about the model tractor that

Mr. Tavares asked E.H. Turf Supply to fix. Evidence is “relevant” when it renders

any fact of consequence more probable than it would be without the evidence. R.I.

R. Evid. 401. Here, the de novo trial before the Superior Court was aimed at

- 11 -
discerning whether Mr. Tavares was obligated to tender payment to E.H. Turf

Supply for services rendered. Mr. Hagenstein testified regarding Mr. Tavares’s

delivery of the tractor to E.H. Turf Supply, E.H. Turf Supply’s procedures for

assessing the tractor and confirming repairs with the owner, Mr. Tavares’s

acceptance of the estimated cost of the repairs, and Mr. Tavares’s payment of the

cost of repairs after work had been completed but prior to stopping payment on his

check. Each of these facts were necessary for the trial justice to make the ultimate

determination regarding whether Mr. Tavares was liable for the unpaid invoice, and

his testimony was therefore relevant.

Mr. Tavares nevertheless suggests that, because Mr. Hagenstein did not

possess working knowledge of the mechanical issues associated with his particular

tractor, all of Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant and should not have been

admitted. This argument, however, conflates substantive knowledge of the

mechanical issues for which Mr. Tavares initially contacted E.H. Turf Supply with

Mr. Tavares’s obligation to pay for services rendered under the invoice to which he

provided his consent. This latter question was the only question presented to the

Superior Court at the de novo trial, and because Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony was

relevant to that question, the trial justice did not err in admitting or relying on Mr.

Hagenstein’s testimony.

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B. Procedural Issues

Mr. Tavares next argues that the trial justice committed error when she

allowed E.H. Turf Supply to present its evidence first and forced him to present his

evidence second. Specifically, Mr. Tavares argues that “the Trial Court’s decision

to allow [E.H. Turf Supply] to proceed and make [its] argument before [him]

affected [his] ability to properly present his arguments and satisfy his burden of proof

as the Appellant.” This argument likewise fails.

Mr. Tavares appealed the District Court judgment to Superior Court under a

statute entitled “Claim of appeal of superior court.” Section 9-12-10. Under that

statute, an appealing party has a statutory right for the Superior Court to exercise its

independent judgment in passing on the merits of the case by holding a new trial.

Val-Gioia Properties, LLC v. Blamires, 18 A.3d 545, 549 (R.I. 2011). When the

Superior Court holds a new trial, what we call a de novo trial, it is “conducted as if

there had been no trial in the first instance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1737 (10th ed.

2014). Therefore, Mr. Tavares’s appeal proceeded under the Superior Court Rules

of Civil Procedure regarding trials in that court. Rule 43(f)(1) of those Rules states

that the party bearing the burden of proof shall open and close the case at trial. See

Super. R. Civ. P. 43(f)(1).

In hearing the case anew, the Superior Court was required to assess the merits

of E.H. Turf Supply’s 2024 complaint as if it had been first filed in Superior Court.

- 13 -
E.H. Turf Supply, as the plaintiff in the 2024 action, bore the burden of proof to

show that Mr. Tavares owed that company money for services rendered on his

tractor. Thus, under the Superior Court Rules, E.H. Turf Supply and not Mr. Tavares

was required to open the case because it was the party that bore the burden to prove

the allegations in the 2024 complaint. See Super. R. Civ. P. 43(f)(1). Therefore, Mr.

Tavares’s argument that the trial justice erred in allowing E.H. Turf Supply to

proceed first is without merit.

C. Evidentiary Error

Mr. Tavares also alleges that the trial justice violated his right to due process

when she excluded particular pieces of evidence that he attempted to introduce at

trial. It is well established that the admissibility of evidence is within the sound

discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere with the trial justice’s

decision unless a clear abuse of that discretion is apparent. ADP Marshall, Inc. v.

Brown University, 784 A.2d 309, 314 (R.I. 2001).

Mr. Tavares sought to introduce three exhibits: an invoice from a

Massachusetts John Deere dealer (which was marked for identification), and two

other invoices, one from before E.H. Turf Supply’s repairs (which was admitted as

a full exhibit), and one from after (which was marked for identification). The trial

justice determined that invoices marked for identification purposes only were

hearsay and therefore could not be admitted as full exhibits. Because the second

- 14 -
invoice was admitted as a full exhibit, we confine our review to assess whether the

trial justice committed an abuse of discretion by marking the first and third exhibit

for identification purposes only.

The trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding that the first and third

exhibits were hearsay and marking them only for identification purposes only. Our

rules define hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” R.I. R. Evid. 801(c). Mr. Tavares informed the trial justice that he sought

to introduce the first invoice to show “the issues that [he] was still having” after

picking the tractor up from E.H. Turf Supply. In essence, Mr. Tavares sought to use

the statements in this invoice and the third invoice regarding later repairs to his

tractor as proof that E.H. Turf Supply had not completed its obligation to repair the

tractor. In order to be admitted on this basis, the statements in the invoices would

need to be accepted as reliable proof. Under our rules, however, the invoices would

be inadmissible for that purpose unless, among other things, someone from the

business who created the invoice could attest that the invoice was accurate. See R.I.

R. Evid. 801(c); 803(6) (defining the regularly conducted activity exception to

hearsay). Because no one from those dealers was present to testify regarding their

contents, the invoices were inadmissible for the truth of their contents, and the trial

- 15 -
justice did not abuse her discretion by allowing them to be marked for identification

purposes only.

Relatedly, Mr. Tavares also argues that the trial justice’s purported errors

constituted a fundamental or structural error that affected the fairness of the

proceeding. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the trial justice

did not commit error during the Superior Court trial; and, consequently, there is no

“structural error” on which to reverse the trial justice. Further, even if we concluded

that the trial justice had committed error, this Court has not formally adopted the

“structural error” or “defect” framework explained by the Supreme Court in Arizona

v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), on which Mr. Tavares principally relies. And

even if we decided to look to Fulminante for guidance, it is distinguishable. That

case, and the cases cited therein, primarily concern overt constitutional violations

affecting the framework of the trial itself. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 (citing

cases involving exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,

deprivation of the right to counsel, and violations of the right to self-representation

and to a public trial). Our review of the record in this case, however, does not reveal

the kinds of constitutional deprivations identified in Fulminante as warranting

- 16 -
reversal under the structural error framework. Therefore, we decline to reverse the

trial justice on that ground.

Mr. Tavares additionally cites Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil

Procedure for the proposition that “errors that affect the substantial rights of the

parties” provide grounds to reverse a judgment. However, that rule contains an

important caveat omitted from Mr. Tavares’s citation: that “no error in either the

admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling * * * is

ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict” unless it is inconsistent

with substantial justice. Super. R. Civ. P. 61. Here, Mr. Tavares’s primary

contentions of error relate to the introduction and presentation of evidence and the

availability of discovery. By its own terms, those are not the types of errors that

Rule 61 is designed to rectify. And, because the trial justice’s decisions did not

interfere with Mr. Tavares’s ability to mount a defense, her rulings were not

inconsistent with substantial justice. See id. Accordingly, Rule 61 is not a viable

ground on which this Court can reverse the trial justice.

D. Self-Represented Litigant

Finally, Mr. Tavares alleges that the trial justice failed to consider his status

as a self-represented litigant when presiding over his trial. Mr. Tavares is correct

that trial justices should be considerate towards self-represented litigants, but those

litigants choosing to proceed without an attorney are still bound by the Superior

- 17 -
Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Oliveira v.

Levesque, 294 A.3d 994, 998 (R.I. 2023) (“[A]lthough ‘pro se litigants are often

granted greater latitude by [a] court,’ they are not exempt from our rules.”) (quoting

Terzian v. Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558 (R.I. 2018)). When an individual elects to

proceed as a self-represented litigant, they undertake a difficult task; but the courts

“cannot and will not entirely overlook established rules of procedure” just because

a litigant is self-represented. Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 585

(R.I. 2005) (quoting Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I. 1987)).

The trial justice reasonably provided Mr. Tavares with significant leeway

during the course of the trial. The trial justice assisted Mr. Tavares by explaining

the process for introducing and using evidence presented for his defense. During the

Superior Court proceeding, the trial justice explained her rulings to make sure Mr.

Tavares understood them. Moreover, when Mr. Tavares attempted to introduce his

first and third invoices as exhibits, the trial justice allowed him an opportunity to

explain how they would be used, then ruled that they were inadmissible as full

exhibits, but instructed Mr. Tavares that he could testify about the events

surrounding their creation. The trial justice further conferred with Mr. Tavares to

determine whether he wanted to be a witness himself and, when he elected to take

the stand, asked, “is there anything you want to tell me that you haven’t already told

me?” Mr. Tavares was subsequently able to provide testimony, which would have

- 18 -
been otherwise absent from the record, on the reasons why plaintiff’s version of

events should not be believed. Mr. Tavares’s status as a self-represented litigant

does not afford him any greater rights than any other litigant appearing in our courts,

and yet the trial justice provided him with considerable flexibility to present a

defense to E.H. Turf Supply’s allegations. On the record before us, we cannot say

that the trial justice erred in her management of this de novo trial.

Conclusion

For the reasons contained herein, the judgment of the Superior Court is

affirmed. The papers may be returned to the Superior Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

E.H. Turf Supply Co., Inc. d/b/a Allen's Seed v.
Title of Case
Roger Tavares.
No. 2024-314-Appeal.
Case Number
(WD 24-282)

Date Opinion Filed July 15, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter

For Plaintiff:

Jonathan J. Lucido, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Roger Tavares, pro se